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Abstract 
 
The melting of the sea-ice in the Russian Arctic has lead to a stronger optimism than ever before 
as regards the supply of Norwegian LNG to Asia-Pacific via the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The 
successful completion of the world’s first LNG supply via the NSR by the Ob River in 2012 has 
been to a large extent highlighted in the media. International oil & gas companies operating in 
northern Norway and Russia should see here promising opportunities to ship LNG via the NSR 
during the summer season. 
The dissertation investigates the feasibility and the economics of the shipping of LNG via the 
NSR. The objective of the thesis is also to clarify and understand some crucial aspects, should 
shipping LNG on this new route occur one day. 
The analysis presents a qualitative approach for the feasibility part. A more quantitative and 
numerical approach is carried out for the economic viability. The study evaluates the profitability 
for a trader of shipping LNG via the NSR compared to the Suez Canal route for a round trip 
Hammerfest-Yokohama. Further on, the economics of an annual regular service via the Suez 
Canal and a service via the NSR during summer with the Suez Canal for the rest of the year are 
compared. The models analyze also the advantage of operating a Triple-Fuel Diesel-Electric 
(TFDE) LNG carrier rather than a Steam Turbine (ST) vessel on these routes. 
In a second part, an annual voyage plan is simulated in order to show how the trader can benefit 
from arbitrage opportunities on gas prices across the continents and to see how shipping via the 
NSR can be linked to exit strategies. The dissertation will also analyze the net present value of a 
15-year LNG trading project and value an extension option of five years on a 15-year Time 
Charter contract.  
Different comprehensive sensitivities on the results are carried out to deal with uncertainty, 
flexibility and to remedy with possible erroneous assumptions. 
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Introduction 
 
The increased Norwegian and Russian Barents Sea oil & gas offshore activity, as well as the 
onshore activity in Russia, have strengthened the attention paid to a deep-sea shipping route via 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in order to reach Asia-Pacific. The Arctic sea-ice is melting at an 
accelerated rate from year to year and light ice conditions from July to November on the NSR 
become more evident with time. The Ob River’s NSR transit success in 2012 has marked the start 
of a new era for shipping LNG from Norway to Asia-Pacific during summer. 
Since the NSR was officially opened to international commercial transit in 2009, the NSR 
Administration (NSRA), in collaboration with the Russian authorities and the icebreaking 
company Rosatomflot, has devoted considerable efforts to make the NSR a safe and reliable route 
for newcomers. Although the NSR will never be a replacement route to the Suez Canal, at least in 
the short to the medium term, the NSR has many positive aspects which can boost its 
competiveness with the Suez Canal during summer if the sea-ice continues melting at the current 
rate. A transit via the NSR requires however serious preliminary planning by the ship owner and 
the charterer and also a close cooperation with Rosatomflot and the NSRA, before and during the 
voyage. In fact, the presence of sea-ice and the unpredictable and frequent weather will not 
forgive if an accident should occur. 
The importance of the NSR increases as the route can potentially save companies valuable time 
between Europe and Asia, with a shortened distance of approximately 40% compared to the Suez 
Canal route. However shortened distance is not always synonym of reduced costs by an 
equivalent percentage.  
This dissertation has a first objective to argue for whether or not a transit via the NSR is feasible 
for a LNG tanker. The second objective is to answer the question whether or not it is 
economically viable to ship LNG on this route. The economic competitivenesses of the NSR and 
the Suez Canal will be compared. 
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I) The feasibility of shipping LNG via the Northern Sea Route 
 
1.1 The LNG industry 
 
1.1.1 Total E&P Norge’s LNG activity in Norway 
 
1.1.1.a)  Definition of LNG 
 
LNG stands for Liquefied Natural Gas and is a result of a liquefaction process of methane 
extracted from gas fields. The percentage volume of methane can vary depending on the origin of 
the gas. It can be superior to 95%, below 90% or in between 90% and 95% (Buhaug, 2011). The 
remaining percentages contain other hydrocarbons and gases such as carbon dioxide and 
nitrogen. The natural gas is liquefied in so called trains, compressors compressing the methane 
until it reaches a temperature of -163°C. At this temperature, the natural gas is in a liquid state 
and the volume is reduced by 1/630
th
 from its gaseous state at atmospheric pressure. It is then 
stored in refrigerated tanks before being loaded on LNG carriers ready to export (Stopford, 2009, 
pp.486). Although the process requires some extra costs, as for example capital costs, 
liquefaction and re-gasification costs and storage related costs, liquefying the gas is advantageous 
as it can be transported in much larger amounts before being re-gasified at the import terminal. 
Natural gas is regarded as an important source of energy for many countries since it provides 
basic needs such as heating and electricity. Furthermore, LNG is today seen as a clean source of 
energy and is becoming increasingly an alternative fuel for many shipping companies. LNG as 
bunker for ships for instance reduces carbon emissions by 20 to 30 percent and reduces sulfur 
oxide and nitrogen oxide discharges to significantly lower levels compared to traditional fuel oil 
(Advantage Environment, 2011). 
1.1.1.b)  Total E&P Norge, part of Total Group 
 
Total Group is a French oil & gas company ranked as the fifth largest, based on market 
capitalization from December 2011. The Group has 96,000 employees spread across 130 
different countries. With activities in both upstream (oil & gas exploration, development and 
production, LNG) and downstream operations (refining, marketing, and trading and shipping of 
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crude oil and other products) Total has a well diversified portfolio of activities (Total, 2013a). 
The headquarters are located in Paris at La Défense. The group’s center of research in exploration 
and development is located in the city of Pau in southern France (Total, 2013b).  
Total is the world’s fourth largest producer of natural gas and is among the top three LNG 
suppliers in the world. They are present in Yemen and Indonesia among many other countries. 
According to them, natural gas is expected to be the second largest fossil fuel in 2030. The LNG 
shipping will play a major role in meeting the global demand. To do so, the supply capacity will 
have to double in the next decade (Total, 2013c). Total is currently investing in two major 
projects in Australia, the Ichthys and Gladstone projects. Around 70% of the future LNG 
volumes extracted from Ichthys LNG will be sent to Japan. The first production should start by 
the end of 2016 (Robin & Demoury, 2012). According to Total, the LNG and the LNG shipping 
markets are respectively two perfect examples of innovative marketing and an efficient 
transportation mode. The group is chartering in partnerships around 70 of the total 370 LNG 
carriers across the world. 
Total E&P Norge (TEPN) is a Norwegian wholly owned subsidiary of Total group and 
contributes to 12% of the company’s oil & gas production. It is the biggest contributor of oil & 
gas among all the subsidiaries around the world (Total E&P Norge, 2013a). TEPN employs 375 
employees and is located in the city of Stavanger (Laurent, 2013). TEPN has a solid portfolio of 
licenses with 90 in total of which they are operator in 27 of them (Total E&P Norge, 2013b). 
 1.1.1.c)  Snøhvit, a major Norwegian gas production field 
 
The gas field of Snøhvit is located in the Norwegian Barents Sea northwest from Hammerfest, at 
a water depth of 310-340 meters (Figure 1). It was discovered in 1984 and the development was 
approved the 7
th
 March 2002 by the Norwegian Government. The operator of the gas field is 
Statoil Petroleum AS, the largest owner with a share of 36.79%. Other international oil & gas 
companies have licenses in the field which are Petoro AS (30.00%), TEPN (18.40%), GDF Suez 
E&P Norge AS (12%) and RWE Dea Norge AS (2.81%). The reservoirs contain gas, condensate 
and oil. The natural gas extracted from Snøhvit is sent to the liquefaction plant of Melkøya in 
Hammerfest through a 160-kilometer long pipeline (Figure 1). Arrived at the liquefaction facility, 
the gas enters a liquefaction process before it is shipped with LNG carriers to the international 
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markets (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy & Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2012). The liquefaction plant of Melkøya in Hammerfest is the only one in Europe (Robin & 
Demoury, 2012). The plant has recently increased its capacity to receive up to 210,000 m
3
 LNG 
carriers, which up to now was limited to 160,000 m
3 
(Laurent, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: Statoil’s LNG plant at Melkøya outside Hammerfest (left) and map of Snøhvit’s location (right) 
Source:  (Aenergy , 2012)                                                   
 
 1.1.1.d)  TEPN’s LNG fleet and nature of the charter agreement 
 
TEPN operates two LNG carriers, the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit, respectively owned by 
Høegh LNG and Teekay LNG Partners L.P. The specifications of the two vessels can be found in 
Appendix A for background information. 
The Arctic Lady (Figure 2) entered into service for TEPN the 13
th
 April 2006 on a long term 
Time Charter (TC) agreement of 20 years with an option of 5+5 years with Høegh LNG. The 
cargo tank containment system of the vessel is a 39.6 m diameter Moss sphere
1
. The spheres are 
suspended in the equator by a continuous skirt as we can see in Figure 3 (Laurent, 2013). 
The Meridian Spirit (Figure 2), former Maersk Meridian, started a spot charter the 1
st
 November 
2010 with Maersk LNG, the former ship owner. The 9
th
 December 2011, TEPN entered a long 
term TC of 18 years for the Maersk Meridian with an option of 5+4 years. In July 2012, Maersk 
LNG decided to sell the carrier to Teekay LNG Partners L.P; the name of the vessel was replaced 
by Meridian Spirit. This was made with the authorization from TEPN since they had the entire 
control of the vessel. The change in ship owner did not affect the time charter party (Laurent, 
2013). The cargo tank containment system of the vessel is a Membrane type Mark III with a 
                                                          
1
 35 mm aluminium tickness 
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primary 1.2 mm thickness corrugated stainless steel and secondary 0.6 mm thickness triplex 
(Figure 3) (Laurent, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: The Arctic Lady (left) and the Meridian Spirit (right)  
Source: (Skipsfoto, 2013) & (The Motorship, 2010) 
 
Figure 3: A typical Moss sphere tank (left) and inside view of a membrane tank (right)  
Source: (Liquefied Gas Carrier, 2011) & (gCaptain, 2012) 
Long term TCs are typically used for long-term finance of LNG tankers such as the Arctic Lady 
and the Meridian Spirit. They can be regarded as a long term leasing. The lessors, Høegh LNG 
and Teekay LNG, whose role is to finance the vessels, have little involvement with the asset 
beyond owning it. All operating responsibilities fall on TEPN, the lessee. The vessels are built to 
TEPN’s specifications and are purchased by companies providing the finance, which can either 
be banks or large corporation companies for instance. The vessels are then leased under a long 
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term agreement (Stopford, 2009, pp.308). For the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit, the nature 
of the leasing agreement is a “Long Term Time Charter in Cost Pass through”. The Time Charter 
Party (TCP) form used by TEPN is the Shell LNG Time Charter form. This charter form 
represents the LNG industry norm for chartering during long or shorter periods (Laurent, 2013). 
Under “Long Term Time Charter in Cost Pass through”, TEPN pays the daily long term time 
charter rate including the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and the operating expenditures (OPEX). 
Since TEPN controls the vessels, according to the charter form, they pay all voyage related costs, 
agency fees, canal dues, port charges, commissions for brokers and bunkering (Laurent, 2013). 
TEPN is marketing the LNG from the Snøhvit production facility to its London-based affiliate 
Total Gas and Power Limited (TGPL) on a long-term contract. The main destinations for this 
contract are the Gulf of Mexico, Spain and north-west Europe. For the North American market, 
TEPN exports LNG to the re-gasification terminals of Sabine Pass in the USA and Altamira in 
Mexico. In Spain, Snøhvit LNG has been shipped to Barcelona, Sagunto, Cartagena and Huelva. 
In 2012, LNG from Snøhvit has been delivered for the first time in the Fos-Cavaou re-
gasification terminal in the south of France. Additionally to these main destinations, LNG from 
Snøhvit has also been delivered to Asian buyers (Terrade, 2013). 
1.1.2 The LNG trade 
 
1.1.2.a)  The LNG supply and demand 
 
From a supply perspective, the LNG production has been growing the last three decades. The 
growth has been accelerating since the early 2000s mainly due to the increased LNG demand 
from new emerging markets. Qatar is by far the world’s largest producer and exporter of LNG. 
Their production reached 75.5 mt in 2011, representing a total share of 31% of world’s 
production at that time (International Gas Union, 2011). In 2007, the country exported LNG to 
eight different countries while in 2011 23 countries imported LNG from Qatar. The strategic 
position of the country makes it well suited to export their gas to Asia-Pacific and Europe. Data 
from 2011 shows that 47% of their exports went to Asia-Pacific and 42% percent was sent to 
Europe (The Peninsula, 2012). With 18.7 mt of additional LNG volumes sold to the rest of the 
world, Qatar accounted for 67% of the global trade growth in 2011 (Robin & Demoury, 2012). 
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Malaysia is the second largest producer with around 2 million mt produced per month 
(Bakkelund, 2012). They overtook Indonesia’s position in 2011 which now ranks third. Other 
countries such as Australia, Nigeria and Algeria are also major key actors in the world LNG 
supply (Figure 4). However, since 2000, the total world supply has been mainly driven by Qatar 
and Nigeria as the supply of LNG from the other countries has remained relatively stable. The 
LNG industry in Australia is still young, but the country has far more gas than it consumes 
internally. This has lead western oil & gas companies to enter the Australian market and invest 
heavily in new infrastructure and in LNG facilities. Australia’s third LNG plant sent its first 
shipment to market in June 2012 (White, 2012).  
 
Figure 4: LNG production – monthly 1999 – 2012 
Source: (Bakkelund, 2012) 
As we have already mentioned, Total is investing massively in Australia with the Ichthys and 
Gladstone projects which are among the seven ongoing venture LNG projects in Australia (Paton, 
2012). The country’s LNG projects under way have reached an astonishing 170 billion dollars 
worth investments in 2012 (White, 2012). With this level of development, Australia is well 
placed to surpass Qatar as the largest exporter of LNG by the end of the decade. Total says that 
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the country may produce as much as 100 million metric tons of LNG a year in the near future 
(Paton, 2012). 
The world supply of LNG in 2012 declined by 1.9% compared to 2011, the first time ever in the 
past thirty years. Maintenance and unscheduled interruptions on existing liquefaction plants with 
only one new train coming into service for Pluto in Australia are the causes behind the reduced 
supply (Robin & Demoury, 2013). 
Looking closely on the demand side, Japan is a central market today for LNG exporters and is by 
far the import leader of LNG in terms of annual volumes. The total imported volumes in 2011 
were estimated to 78.8 mt (International Gas Union, 2011). Japan saw its LNG imports to 
increase dramatically after the Fukushima earthquake on 11
th
 March 2011. Four of the 54 nuclear 
reactors in the country were severely damaged and 48 were shut down (Bakkelund, 2012). 
Consequently, alternative sources of energy had to be found and natural gas was one them. LNG 
demand from Japan during the second half of 2011 was on average 900,000 mt per month higher 
than the same period in 2010 (Hang, 2012). The country accounted for 41.6% of Asia’s 
additional LNG imports and had a global LNG import share of 32.8% in 2011 (Robin & 
Demoury, 2012).   
South Korea is the second larger importer of LNG and combined with Japan they consumed 48% 
of the LNG supplied in 2011. Recently, fast growing markets like China and India are seeing 
their LNG imports increasing remarkably as their appetite for more energy is greater 
(International Gas Union, 2011). 
The LNG imports in Europe reached a peak in the first half of 2011. Over the second half of 
2011, LNG imports have dropped by 8.7% year-on-year which was explained by the warmer 
weather and the lower utilization rates of the Spanish gas-fired power plants (Hang, 2012). The 
falling LNG imports into Spain started when the country shifted the Algerian imports from LNG 
to gas via pipelines. A new pipeline became operational in April 2011 (Hang, 2012). The 
decrease in LNG imports to Europe continued during the first half of 2012 and fell by 33% year-
on-year over this period. This fall does not mean that the continent will remain undersupplied 
because they rely considerably on gas via pipelines coming from Norway and Russia. 
Furthermore, the price competitiveness relative to renewal energies and coal has been declining 
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in the region. The negative trend should continue and supply of LNG to Europe should drop by 
70% by 2015 from the August 2012 level (Gloystein, 2012). Figures for the first quarter of 2013 
show that about 9 million tons of LNG has been delivered to Europe compared to 13.8 million for 
the first quarter in 2012. This negative trend is a combination of high prices in Asia causing 
diversions and also robust prices in Brazil and Argentina. Increased gas imports to the UK by 
pipelines in the first quarter 2013 from Norway and Holland have jumped around 10% compared 
to the last quarter in 2012, which in terms have pushed the LNG imports down (Meredith, 2013). 
Wood Mackenzie is predicting imports to drop until 2015. Beyond 2017, the imports should start 
rising again but it will take long time before we are back to the top level in 2011 (Meredith, 
2013). In Figure 5, it is also worth to notice that the LNG imports in North America have 
flattened the last years and started to decrease since 2010. This trend is treated under section 
1.1.2.b) below. 
 
Figure 5: LNG import by region – monthly 1995 – 2012 
Source: (Bakkelund, 2012) 
The higher demand from Japan combined with the strong economic growth from the Asian 
countries has lengthen transport distances between the Atlantic basin and the Pacific basin. The 
higher volumes transported in addition to the longer distances have caused a strong growth in the 
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inter-basin ton-mile supply of LNG. Figure 6 shows the average shipping distance evolution 
since 2002 and the inter-basin volume by country. We observe that the average distance has 
followed a positive trend since 2002. We also notice that the volume growth was particulary high 
between 2006 and 2008 just before the financial crisis hit. After a sharp fall  in 2009 and 2010, 
the recovery of traded volumes started on the beginning of 2011, mainly driven by Japan 
(Bakkelund, 2012). 
 
Figure 6: Inter-basin volume and transport distance - quarterly 2002-2012 
Source: (Bakkelund, 2012) 
1.1.2.b)  A new era with the American shale gas 
 
The American shale gas revolution has the last few years changed the world picture of the natural 
gas market. The growth in US gas production has been driven by the ability to extract 
unconventional gas at cheaper rates (International Gas Union, 2011). Seen as more affordable and 
easy to extract, the USA have a clear intention to promote and attract new investors for exploiting 
this unconventional source of energy on their own territory. The natural gas production has 
jumped to high levels recently. In 2000, shale gas represented only 2% of the American gas 
supply; by 2012 the share of shale gas has increased to 37% of the American supply (Mufson, 
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2012). The International Energy Agency says that if the trend continues, America could become 
self-sufficient in energy by 2035 (The Economist, 2012). While cheap and plentiful gas has its 
advantages to provide cheap electricity, which in term boosts the power-hungry North American 
industry, the gas revolution has created a new picture in terms of pricing we see across the world. 
Due to the recovery of the American shale gas, the US gas prices are expected to remain 
respectively 50 and 70 percent lower than prices in Europe and Japan (Mufson, 2012). At the end 
of October 2012, the Henry Hub (HH) gas price index averaged 2.64 USD/mmBtu which is 36% 
lower than the same period in 2011 (Federal Energy Regulatory Comission [FERC], 2013). The 
growth in shale gas production has emerged as a shock for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
Americans being gradually self sufficient with gas will see their imports of LNG to drop over the 
next decade. Furthermore, there is a growing uncertainty about whether other countries will be 
able to replicate the Americans by extracting shale gas on their own territory (International Gas 
Union, 2011). As an example, China seems already to be on the way to extract natural gas on its 
own territory. Several shale gas licensing rounds have been already carried out and the country is 
now planning a new round. The Chinese Ministry of Land Resources is willing to urge local 
government officials to select up to 20 shale gas blocks to offer to Chinese businesses (Yihe, 
2013). The amount of shale gas China aims to produce by 2015 is evaluated to 6.5 billion m
3
 
(Yihe, 2013). Thirdly, one new development for the coming years will be the start of LNG export 
from the USA. The first American export project in Sabine Pass is due to start in late 2015. The 
US department of energy says that further project expansions of LNG exports will add value for 
the country (RS Platou, 2013). Despite a fall in gas imports to Europe, US exports could see their 
volumes to find home in Europe. The old continent is willing to diversify its supply sources of 
LNG and many European companies are considering US LNG as a potential supply source to not 
only relay principally on Qatari gas (Meredith, 2013). 
From the Norwegian perspective, the development of the LNG plant in Melkøya was initially 
built with exports to the USA in mind. However, the recent recovery of shale gas on the 
American territory and the lower US imports of LNG has made the gas prices to drop and hence 
less interesting to ship LNG there. For the time being there is an increased interest for LNG in 
Asia for instance (McGrath, 2012). Consequently, the picture we observe today is the LNG flows 
moving east and not west anymore. The shale gas revolution has turned the market upside down 
(McGrath, 2012). However, TEPN has long term commitments of selling the gas from Snøhvit to 
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the North American and European markets. The Group cannot decide to send instead all their 
shipment to Asia. The possibility of sending their LNG east of Suez can arise sometimes when 
the opportunity of benefiting from arbitrage is there (Laurent, 2013). 
1.1.2.c)  The LNG pricing and arbitrage opportunities 
 
As the interest for natural gas is increasingly going global, the gas market is not global in terms 
of pricing (International Gas Union, 2011). Worldwide natural gas prices can be divided in three 
main categories: 
1- For the North American market, we have the Henry Hub (HH) price index where spot  
               and futures are being traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). 
2- In Europe, the main gas price reference is the National Balancing Point (NBP).  
3- For the Asian market, the Japan/Korea Spot (JKS) is the most common reference used.  
 
Figure 7: Natural gas prices and respective spreads in USD/mmBtu – monthly 2000 – 2013 
Source: Data provided from TEPN (Laurent, 2013) 
 
Figure 7 shows the gas pricing schemes as well as the price spreads which are source of arbitrage. 
For the NBP and HH prices references, the period starts form February 2000 and lasts to 
February 2013. The JKS reference starts from February 2009. All data are expressed in 
USD/mmBtu on a monthly basis. 
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As we already know, the shale gas effect has contributed to change significantly the price picture 
of the international gas market. The US gas imports have fallen sharply since the financial crisis 
in 2008 and the HH has stabilized to around 3-4 USD/mmBtu the last couple of years as we can 
see in Figure 7. Since March 2010, price spreads between the three continents are more evident. 
While the JKS prices are reaching all time high levels around 20 USD/mmBtu, the NBP is 
oscillating around the 10 USD/mmBtu level and the Henry Hub has recently fallen under 3 
USD/mmBtu.  
The correlation factor represented by “pi/j”, where i and j refer to two of the three price indexes, 
can give us a good idea of the degree in which the three curves from Figure 7 vary together or 
not
2
.  
The results give us the following 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Correlation factors by periods 
Source: Data provided from TEPN (Laurent, 2013) 
NBP and HH have a positive but weak correlation of 0.36 from February 2000 to January 2013 
meaning that the two price references tend to vary together over these 13 years. When dividing 
into two sub periods, we notice that the NBP and the HH have a relatively high degree of 
correlation of 0.73 between February 2000 and January 2009 and a negative correlation of -0.38 
from January 2009 to January 2013. We can think of the US shale gas as the main explanation 
behind this shift of sign. 
                                                          
2
 Due to lack of information, data from February 2000 to January 2009 for the JKS are not represented in Figure 7 
January 2013 January 2009 February 2000 
pNBP/HH = 0,36 
pNBP/HH = -0,38 pNBP/HH = 0,73 
pNBP/JKS = 0,87 
pHH/JKS = -0,52 
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The NBP and JKS tend to vary much together with a positive correlation of 0.87 between January 
2009 and January 2013. For the HH and JKS over the same period, the behavior seems to be the 
opposite with a negative correlation of -0.52.  
The different gas price schemes across the markets and the covariance results give the possibility 
for oil & gas companies such as Total to arbitrage and sell gas at the best rate at the right time. 
The main strategic challenges for Total are meeting the needs for their customers and at the same 
time transporting the LNG at the lowest cost (Total, 2013d).  
Total is one of the few having developed LNG trading capabilities (Total, 2013d). The Group’s 
main trading offices are located in London at TGPL. When Total is going to ship LNG to Europe 
where the price is at 10 USD/mmBtu and the traders see a possibility to sell the gas in Japan for 
20 USD/mmBtu, there is an arbitrage opportunity to get a 10 USD/mmBtu in additional revenue. 
What would that mean in term of loss revenues if they did not transport the gas to Japan instead? 
If you take a conventional 160,000 m
3
 LNG cargo vessel, the loss in revenue, excluding cost 
transportation differences, would represent: 
                                                                                  
 
This amount is too high to be ignored. Since the gas market is going global while price 
differences persist, the arbitrage opportunities across countries for the Group are increasing. The 
trading center in London enables the group to find the most profitable markets (Total, 2013d). 
1.1.3 The LNG Shipping Market 
 
1.1.3.a)  The LNG Charter Market 
 
In the LNG charter market, spot prices have been relatively high since the summer 2010. This 
increase can be explained by different reasons. The number of new vessel deliveries was low in 
2012 which caused a shortage of available carriers in the market. This effect was combined, as 
we already know, with the earthquake in Japan in 2011 which led to a sharp increase in LNG 
demand. Higher Asian LNG demand from the Atlantic basin strengthened this effect and 
lengthened the inter-basin travel time which in term limited the short run transport supply 
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(Arnsdorf, 2011). The spot charter rates reached a historical peak during the spring 2012 of USD 
150,000 per day (RS Platou, 2013). For a 138,000-145,000 m
3
 LNG carrier, the east of Suez and 
west of Suez spot charter rates vary around 120,000 USD/day and the 1-year Time Charter (TC) 
rates are at 110,000 USD/day (Fearnley LNG, 2013). Figure 9 gives us the LNG shipping rates 
for a 155,000 m
3
 LNG carrier back from the end of 2009.  
 
Figure 9: LNG Freight rates in USD/day 
Source: (Fearnley LNG, 2013) 
1.1.3.b)  The world’s LNG fleet and order book 
 
The LNG shipping market is growing fast with a current world fleet of 380 vessels (big and 
smaller carriers combined) and a total of 102 carriers on order (RS Platou, 2013). In 2012, only 
two new vessels were delivered (RS Platou, 2012) so the world fleet has not changed 
dramatically from 2011. 2011 was also a strong year in terms of new orders. The cumulative 
number of outstanding orders in the order book was 67 at the end of 2011; these orders include 
Floating Storage Regasification Units, FSRUs (International Gas Union, 2011). 
The number of carriers available in the spot market is low. With 3 to 4 carriers available in total, 
east and west of Suez combined; the spot market is still tight (Fearnley LNG, 2013). The few 
vessels available in spot and the high number of new orders are explained by the high LNG 
demand on a world basis. This has lead to high levels of spot and TC rates as we have observed 
the last months. 
 1.1.3.c)  The LNG shipping perspectives for the coming years 
 
Based on RS Platou’s expectations, the transported volumes for 2013 should increase by 3% from 
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2012. Two new LNG projects are expected to start production, the Angola LNG  and Sonatrach’s 
Skikda project. Regarding the orderbook, there will be 23 vessels delivered from shipyards in 
2013 and 35 vessels in 2014. These numbers are high compared to the 2 vessels delivered in 2012 
(RS Platou, 2013). Many of the new uncommitted deliveries for 2013 and 2014 are highly 
speculative. The market holds its breath. According to an industry observer, if he was an owner, 
he would be scared. He would have fixed a contract as soon as possible he says (Hine, 2013a). 
The development in transport distances are difficult to forecast but should decrease by 1% per 
year in 2013 and 2014 as the inter-basin trade will continue at a high level. Nevertheless, the 
increase in LNG supply from the Middle East is a fact and should continue the coming years. 
Most of these LNG volumes should be exported east of Suez shortening the average transport 
distances at the expense of the inter-basin trade (RS Platou, 2013). 
In 2013, the LNG market will still be tight; the vessel utilization rate should increase slightly 
from 95% to 96%. For 2014, the high growth of new deliveries (8%) coupled with a lower 
demand growth should cause a fall in the vessel utilization rate to 91%. This should also have a 
repercussion on the short term TC rates. While the expectations for 2013 are USD 125,000 per 
day, for 2014 the rates are expected to fall to USD 82,000 per day (RS Platou, 2013). A Greek 
owner expects spot rates to fall down to the 90,000 USD/day range. Other predict a much more 
severe fall down to 50,000 USD/day for steam turbine vessels by the end of the year (Hine, 
2013a). 
1.2 The Northern Sea Route  
1.2.1 Definition and historical background 
 
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) can be defined in different ways when it comes to its start and 
end point, hence, regarding distances and borders. However, officially the NSR is defined as 
follows: “The water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be considered as the water area 
adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation, comprising the internal sea waters, the 
territorial sea, the adjacent zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and 
confined in the east with the Line of Maritime Demarcation with the United States of America 
and Cape Dezhnev parallel in Bering Strait, with the meridian of Cape Mys Zhelania to the 
Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the western borders of Matochkin Strait, Kara Strait and 
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Yugorski Strait” (Balmasov, 2012a). In other words, the NSR region starts from the Novaya 
Zemlya Island in the west and ends at the Bering Strait in the east. As the definition suggests, the 
NSR cannot be seen as a single linear route, but should be thought of as a region or a whole sea 
area between Novaya Zemlya and the Bering Strait (Ragner, 2000). The distance of the NSR is 
generally considered to be from 2100 to 2900 nm (Liu & Kronbak, 2009). Consequently, actual 
distances can vary. Depending on the seasons and thus ice conditions, vessels will have to choose 
the most adapted route (Center for High North Logistics [CHNL], 2013a). A map of the NSR’s 
geographic area with the different routes in blue is illustrated in Figure 10 (p25). From west to 
east, the NSR starts at the Kara strait and continues through the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, 
followed by the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea before ending at the Bering Strait. 
The NSR was initially used for national purposes and foreign carriers were historically prevented 
from using the NSR (Liu & Kronbak, 2009). From the 1930’s the Soviet Union developed the 
NSR as an internal Russian waterway in support of the industrial development in the Arctic 
resources (Ragner, 2000). They devoted considerable efforts to develop the whole Arctic region 
with ports, marine transportation and infrastructure in order to supply populated regions with 
natural resources (Mulherin, et al., 1996). In 1970, the NSR played a central role as the Soviet 
Union started to exploit vast amounts of natural resources, from oil to gas (Truc, 2013). However, 
since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the shutdowns of the military bases and the fall in 
mining activity in these regions reduced the shipping traffic by five (Truc, 2013). The activity in 
the NSR reached its peak in 1987 with 6.6 million tons of cargo transported. At that same time, in 
October, Gorbachev delivered a speech in Murmansk where he declared his willingness to open 
the NSR for international traffic. 
The initiative was followed-up with the formal opening of the NSR to foreign vessels and the 
“Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route” were approved in 1990. 
From 1987 to 1999 the NSR cargo volumes dropped with 76% from the peak level which was 
mainly caused by the decline in industrial production and investment activity, and the shrinking 
population in the northern regions of Russia. Political issues were also responsible for this decline 
(Liu & Kronbak, 2009). 
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Since the early 2000s, we have seen almost a decade of neglect of the NSR from the Russian 
Federation which has caused the maritime freight to decrease, ports to fall into disrepair and 
nuclear icebreakers to age. Nevertheless, in 2008, Moscow decided to open the NSR for 
international transit during July and August. The route was officially open for international 
commercial transit in 2009. Since then, the navigation period hasn’t stopped extending. Today 
the route is open during five months from July to November (Truc, 2013). In terms of transits via 
the NSR (without stops on the way), Russia claims that 46 vessels carrying 1.2 million tons of 
cargo utilized the NSR in 2012, between the 23
rd
 June and the 18
th
 November, of which 21 
travelled in the westerly direction and 25 took the eastern direction (Hine, 2013b). This number 
of 46 transits is small when comparing it to the annual number of transits through the Suez Canal 
(Truc, 2013). However, the 46 transits via the NSR in 2012 represent an impressive increase from 
the 2 transits in 2009, the 4 ones in 2010 and the 34 ones in 2011. The positive trend for 2013 
should continue and we should expect to see more commercial transits than in 2012 (Gunnarsson, 
2013). Rosatomflot is expecting an increase in the NSR traffic for 2013 and should equal 1.5 
million tons cargo, maybe more. This represents a 25% increase from the 2012 level (Belkin, 
2013). 
1.2.2 The evolution of the Arctic sea-ice coverage 
 
The study of ice conditions is essential to understand the feasibility of a voyage via the NSR. The 
sea-ice extent is cyclical along the year which means that the covered ice area increases during 
the fall and winter period while it decreases during the spring and summer period. Every year the 
sea-ice extent cyclical curve has a peak and a trough that varies from year to year (Ragner, 2000). 
There is no doubt that the Arctic sea-ice extent during summer has been diminishing the last 
couple of decades and that the phenomenon has been accelerating since the mid 2000s. As we 
observe in Figure 11 the September sea-ice coverage since 2006 has been decreasing and it is 
particularly evident from September 2009 to September 2012. 
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Figure 10: The Northern Sea Route 
Source: (Ragner, 2000) 
 
Figure 11: Arctic sea-ice extent evolution from 2006 to 2012 (from upper left to right)  
Source: (National Snow & Ice Data Center, 2013) 
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The main factor influencing the navigation on the NSR is the presence of ice. The seasonal and 
annual variability of ice is typical for all areas on the NSR (CHNL, 2013b). However, the sea-ice 
extent varies from sea-to-sea. The south-western Kara Sea and the south-western Chukchi Sea for 
instance have historically the lightest ice conditions while the Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea 
usually has more difficult ice conditions (Ragner, 2000). Under normal winter conditions, 
navigation along the NSR is not profitable and it is far to hazardous for commercial shipping due 
to the harsh climate conditions, the thick ice from the Laptev to the East Siberian Sea and the 
extreme low temperatures. However, the observable climate change trends indicate that the polar 
ice is shrinking at an impressive rate which should lead to good prospects for shipping during 
summer (Ragner, 2000). The navigation periods on the NSR starts theoretically at the beginning 
of July and can last up to the second half of November, again, depending on the years (CHNL, 
2013b). The NSR seaways were open for navigation during 141 days in 2011 (CHNL, 2013b). 
Taking this number into account and if the conditions allow, TEPN could in theory make at least 
two round trips between Hammerfest and Yokohama through the NSR which would save the 
company valuable sailing time. 
 
Figure 12: September Arctic sea-ice extent 1979-2012 
Source: (National Snow & Ice Data Center, 2013) 
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The Arctic sea-ice in 2012 was at its lowest level ever recorded since the recording began nearly 
three decades ago (Matt, 2012). On September 2012, the National Snow and Ice Data Center 
registered the lowest number in million square kilometers of sea-ice coverage since 1979. It was 
estimated to 3.6 million km
2
. For comparison, in 2009 and 2008, the registered data was 
respectively 5.4 and 4.9 million km
2
 (National Snow & Ice Data Center, 2013). Figure 12 shows 
a negative trend of the sea-ice extent since 1979. One can notice the impressive drop in 2012. It is 
interesting to study September month since it is the period of the year where the Arctic sea-ice 
extent is at its lowest level (Figure 13) and where shipping transits are most likely to happen. 
This is good news for TEPN seeing the possibility to ship LNG through the NSR in order to 
reach the Asian-Pacific market. 
 
Figure 13: Arctic sea-ice extent (Area of ocean with at least 15% sea-ice) 
Source: (National Snow & Ice Data Center, 2013) 
1.2.3 The Economic Interest of the NSR 
1.2.3.a)  The main drivers 
 
The NSR has recently attracted worldwide attention from cargo owners and ship owners seeing 
this route as strategically interesting for shipping goods between Europe and Asia (Ragner, 
2000). Seen a unique opportunity, the distance saved from northern Europe to Asia-Pacific 
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compared to the Suez Canal route can be up to 40% depending on the ports of departure and 
arrival (Liu & Kronbak, 2009). 
The Eurasian Arctic presents a commercial opportunity for the shipping industry. The region is 
rich in hydrocarbons and other natural resources such as iron ore. Russia has the world’s largest 
gas reserves and wishes to benefit from the development of the NSR to facilitate their exports. 
The example of the Yamal LNG project, which will be described later, will have a significant 
impact on the future of this route and should develop considerable growth in the whole region. 
The Eurasian Arctic has changed from having a distance disadvantage to having a transport 
opportunity to reach the fast growing markets in Asia during the summer season (Gunnarsson, 
2012a). The sea-ice reduction during summer and the national interest from Russia and other 
countries have led to more optimism then ever before (Gunnarsson, 2012a). President Vladimir 
Putin has expressed his wish to develop the NSR for international shipping. According to him, 
the NSR is becoming more cost-efficient for transporting goods from Europe to the Asia-Pacific 
area, as compared to the route via the Suez Canal (Hine, 2013b). Moscow has also announced 
that 35 billion Euros will be invested in Russia’s “great north” within 2020 in order to modernize 
the ports, the infrastructure and the communication facilities (Truc, 2013). 
The Russian icebreaking service company, Rosatomflot, wishes to attract international shipping 
companies and become more competitive with the traditional route through the Suez Canal 
(Belkin, 2013). Despite that, according to Laurence C. Smith, an American professor and 
researcher from UCLA in California, the shipping traffic via the Suez Canal will not be out of 
date at the first. Vyacheslav Ruksha, head of Rosatomflot, claims that the NSR will never be a 
replacement route to the Suez route, but an alternative route for shipments from the North Sea 
and Baltic Sea to northeast Asia (Truc, 2013). One will never see an all year long transit via the 
NSR in the short to the medium term (Lieungh, 2013).  
To come back to the question of arbitrage mentioned under section 1.1.2.b), along with the 
arbitrage opportunity for TEPN follows also the strategic value of being able to supply LNG to 
Japan. A company such as TEPN loading its cargo in Hammerfest may not be able to supply 
Japan as the country is considered to distant via the Suez Canal. In addition, closer LNG 
suppliers to Japan exist as we already know like Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia. The shipping 
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length will raise an additional risk as the vessel may not be back in time for its next cargo loading 
in Hammerfest. Consequently, the NSR has the advantage for TEPN and other companies to 
reach new markets without affecting considerably the overall shipping distance (Lauritzen, 2013).  
1.2.3.b)  A challenging route  
 
Before entering the NSR, many seafarers onboard the vessels having experienced an NSR transit 
have been questioning themselves about many things. Is the route totally free of ice? What is the 
ice’s size and density? Will we avoid the fog? Will the vessel be capable to follow the ice 
breaker’s track? Are the crew members up to face an eventual emergency in such a hostile 
environment? (Truc, 2013). 
The recent willingness from the Russian authorities to revive the NSR will require billions of 
dollars of investments in order to make the sea route competitive to the Suez route. Although the 
Russian authorities have plans to invest 35 billion Euros until 2020, the overall investment in the 
Arctic could reach $100 billion or more for the coming decade (Vukmanovic & Koranyi, 2013). 
From an operational point of view, there are some challenges to take into consideration before 
planning to sail along the NSR. Long distances and the lack of infrastructure along the NSR coast 
line are a fact (Balmasov, 2012b). Differences in developed infrastructure between the northwest 
and northeast of Russia can cause problems. Adapted rescue centers along the coast are still 
missing and some ports are incapable to receive vessels with a draft exceeding 10 meters 
(Gunnarsson, 2013). This is especially the case along the Laptev and East Siberian Sea where we 
often find the most extreme weather conditions. On the other hand, the Russian authorities have 
plans to develop ten integrated emergency and rescue centers located along the coast. The 
expansion and progressive renewal of the ice breaker fleet from Rosatomflot has become a 
national concern (Gunnarsson, 2013). The Government is also planning to build floating 
terminals in order to receive the vessels with high drafts (Gunnarsson, 2013). According to Tore 
Henriksen, a law professor at the University of Tromsø, there is a whole series of obstacles: legal 
deficiencies, the irregularity of sea ice, lack of search and rescue, poor access to ports, 
communications and deficiencies in satellite coverage (Vukmanovic & Koranyi, 2013).  
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From an environmental point of view, ship owners may face some problems with fog reducing 
considerably the visibility (Balmasov, 2012b). This may in periods reduce the sailing speed 
which often is a synonym of lost time. Furthermore, pushing-off and pushing-to winds are source 
of a potential deviation of vessels which increase the total sailing distance. These violent winds 
on the NSR can represent a severe threat for the vessels since they can also push ice blocks into 
the vessels’ hull. That explains why ice breakers are essential to avoid taking any unnecessary 
risk of meeting an iceberg, even during summer (Truc, 2013). 
An unfavorable business environment in Russia, a high level of corruption and communication 
problems can reinforce this challenge. It is difficult and not safe to do business in Russia, despite 
the high growth level of the country (Browder, 2011). However, the willingness from the Russian 
government to develop the NSR should facilitate the procedure to get a permit of transit. 
According to Gunnar Sander from Norsk Polarinstitutt, the difference in ice conditions during 
summer and winter will be a problem for many ship owners. A survey has shown that many of 
them consider the irregularity of the shipping traffic as a major problem. Extra logistics for 
sailing via the NSR during summer and via the Suez during winter will be required (Lieungh, 
2013). 
1.2.3.c)  Evidence of a feasible transit 
 
History has shown that there have been transits before and that there will be likely more of them 
in the future.  
Tschudi Shipping Company AS, a Norwegian shipping company, made some calculations of the 
shipping time between Melkøya in Hammerfest and Yokohama via the NSR and the Suez Canal. 
They assumed a sailing speed of 13 knots for both routes. The distance between Melkøya-Suez-
Yokohama is 12,510 nm and 5,827 nm for Melkøya-NSR-Yokohama. The voyage should last 
40.1 days for the Suez route and 18.7 days for the NSR meaning that 21.4 days can in theory be 
saved (Tschudi, 2012). Those numbers should be taken with a degree of caution. The distances 
and speed may vary from time to time depending on the weather conditions but also on the nature 
of the vessel. Nothing can predict a constant sailing speed of 13 knots across the NSR and an 
exact distance of 5,827 nm. However, these numbers give a preliminary idea of the distance and 
time benefits for sailing through the NSR. 
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For a particular Ice Class 1A LNG tanker of 173,400 m
3
 basic winterized, the Russian 
icebreaking service company, Rosatomflot, said that the vessel was accepted for a NSR transit 
and the most favorable period would be August to October. They could provide the average 
speed of 12 to 14 knots. The transit via the NSR (from Kara Strait to the Bering Strait) would 
take approximately 8 days given that the actual mentioned speed was maintained. They also 
expressed their willingness to go into further preliminary negotiations (Belkin, 2013). Ice Class 
ships have a strengthened hull which enables them to navigate through sea-ice. An Ice Class 
vessel is not necessarily an ice breaker (Table1). 
The voyage simulation from Tschudi and the sentiments from Rosatomflot support the idea of a 
feasible transit via the NSR during summer.  
DNV Class 
Notification 
Equivalent Lloyd 
Register 
Notification 
Vessel Type Ice Conditions Impact Limits 
ICE-C 1D 
All Ship Types 
Very light ice 
conditions 
No ramming 
ICE-1C 1C 0.4 m ice thickness* 
ICE-1B 1B 0.6 m ice thickness* 
ICE-1A 1A 0.8 m ice thickness* 
ICE-1A* 1A Super 1.0 m ice thickness* 
*First year ice and broken channel 
 
Table 1: Classification of the most common Ice Classes in the market 
Source: (Koren, 2007) 
We are still in an early stage when it comes to having a regular transit via the NSR. The traffic 
along the NSR is much smaller than the traditional route via the Suez Canal. As mentioned 
before, 46 vessels transited the NSR in 2012; one of them only was a LNG carrier, (Hine, 2013b). 
These numbers are low compared to the 17,225 vessels having transited the Suez Canal in 2012 
of which 800 were LNG carriers, in ballast and laden combined (Suez Canal Traffic Statistics, 
2012). Nevertheless, the opportunity exists for ship owners. 
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Between the 7
th
 November and the 5
th
 December 2012, the 150,000 m
3
 Ice Class 1A Ob 
River, built in 2007 and chartered by Gazprom, successfully achieved its trip from Hammerfest to 
Tobata in Japan via the NSR. Under the voyage planning, the ship owner Dynagas Ltd had 
collected and studied many observation data in order to be best prepared. They had daily ice 
reports and forecasts concerning the weather and ice conditions (Lauritzen, 2013). Some may 
wonder how the vessel could have sailed via the NSR so late during the year. As we already 
know, the Arctic sea-ice extent was at its lowest level ever registered in September 2012. This 
made the navigation during November possible since the ice recovery took longer time. With 
134,066 m
3
 LNG on board the Ob River’s NSR transit started the 9th November and ended the 
18
th
 November 2012 (Laurent, 2013). The vessel was escorted by two ice breakers from 
Rosatomflot and led by two ice pilots (Gazprom, 2012). The average sailing speed via the NSR 
from the Kara Strait to the Bering Strait was claimed 15 knots according to Dynagas (Lauritzen, 
2013). The voyage was perfectly completed in line with their expectation and Dynagas 
experienced neither positive nor negative surprises (Lauritzen, 2013).  
 
Figure 14: The Ob River being loaded at Melkøya 
Source: (Egholm, 2012) 
1.2.3.d)  The importance for Total and TEPN of the NSR in the near future 
 
The Ob River’s NSR transit accomplishment between Hammerfest and Tobata received a lot of 
attention from a couple of other oil & gas companies in Norway. TEPN is one of them and they 
take the successful transit of the Ob River seriously seeing big potentials in terms of distance 
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savings, days saved, cost and emission reductions. The forecasts of growth in the scope of 
transportation in the Arctic are also related to the exploration of new fields and exportation of 
raw materials from the Arctic shelf (CHNL, 2013a). 
 
 
Figure 15: View of the Russian icebreakers from the Ob River sailing on the NSR 
Source: (Lauritzen, 2013) 
 
Figure 16: View from the Ob River on the NSR 
Source: (Lauritzen, 2013) 
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An example can be the “Yamal LNG megaproject” situated on the Yamal peninsula along the 
Kara Sea in northern Russia. The Yamal LNG project is developed by a joint venture of Novatek 
(80%) and Total Group (20%). The mission of the project is to exploit the vast natural gas 
reserves and build a three train gas liquefaction plant and export the LNG to the international 
market. By 2016, the first production train should be in operation, although some speculate that 
the project will be postponed to early 2017 (LNG World News, 2013). The project will alone 
boost Russia’s production of LNG from 11 to 27.5 million tons and increase shipping volumes 
along the NSR to an estimated 20 million tons per year (Staalesen, 2012). This number 
corresponds to three times the record of 1987 of 6.6 million tons. 
This megaproject will have undoubtedly a considerable impact on the shipping traffic in northern 
Russia. The LNG cargoes will be shipped out from the port of Sabetta to Asia and Europe. The 
plan is to send half of the LNG volumes east via the NSR during summer and the remaining half 
west. During winter, when the NSR is icebound, all the shipment will be sent west where the plan 
is to transship the gas in European waters to free up tonnage. In total, the partners are planning to 
build between 12 and 16 Arc-7
3
 Ice Class LNG carriers. These vessels will be unique in their 
class since they will be icebreakers and the price per unit could pass the 300 million dollars 
(Hine, 2013c). Knowing that the market price for a conventional LNG carrier today is situated 
around 200 million dollars; the total investment in icebreakers for the Yamal project represents a 
considerable amount. Novatek wishes to have a year round export operation from Yamal LNG, 
even during the worst winter conditions, which explains why they will need icebreaking LNG 
carriers. According to them, the navigability to Asia via the NSR during the summer 2011 had 
given good results. Novatek shipped more than 600,000 tons via this route in 2011 which 
corresponded to 9 cargos (Selstad, 2012). The “Vladimir Tikhonov”, a Suezmax gas condensate 
tanker carried 120,843 tons of cargo and sailed via the NSR in a record time of 7 days at an 
average speed of 14 knots (Gunnarsson, 2012b).  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Russian classification 
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Figure 17: The suezmax “Vladimir Tikhonov” escorted by a Russian nuclear icebreaker  
Source: (The Maritime Executive, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 18: Location of Yamal LNG 
Source: (Selstad, 2012) 
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1.3 The Russian NSR transit rules and regulations 
1.3.1 The Northern Sea Route Administration  
 
Before studying the economic viability for a NSR transit, it is important to understand what the 
latest Russian rules of navigation on the NSR tell us. New rules were approved by the Ministry of 
Transport of the Russian Federation the 17
th
 January 2013 (Ministry of Transport of Russian 
Federation, 2013). 
The overall supervision and arrangement of the NSR is controlled by the Northern Sea Route 
Administration (NSRA), established as a Federal State-owned Institution. The targets of the 
NSRA are preventing pollution, protecting the marine environment and ensuring a safe 
navigation in the NSR waters (Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation, 2013). The NSRA 
receives and considers all submitted applications and issues permissions for navigation through 
the NSR. They have department responsible for research within weather, ice and navigational 
conditions. Certificates of ice pilotage on the NSR are issued by the NSRA. Other main functions 
of the NSRA are to assist in eliminating the consequences of pollution from vessels, assist in the 
organization of search and rescue operations, coordinate the installation of navigational aids and 
make recommendations about development of routes of navigation in close cooperation with 
Rosatomflot (Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation, 2013). 
1.3.2 Requirements for navigation through the NSR 
 
The owner or the Master of a vessel wishing to transit the NSR should submit an application form 
to the NSRA. The application should indicate some core pieces of information of the vessel 
characteristics, name, flag, and IMO number. Documents as copies of the vessel ownership 
certificate; the classification certificate, the right to navigation certificate etc. have to be attached 
to the application. According to those regulations, the NSRA considers the application within ten 
working days and informs then the applicant about the decision. The application should be 
submitted to the NSRA not earlier than 120 calendar days and not later than 20 days before the 
expected date of the vessel’s entering into the NSR water area (Ministry of Transport of Russian 
Federation, 2013). 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 37 - 
 
A permit can be refused from the NSRA for different reasons. Incorrect information can be 
specified on the application, a failure to provide all the necessary documents in attachments or 
the non-conformity of the vessel as safety requirements are often the main reasons. The 
shipmaster has to notify the NSRA of the expected time of entering the NSR at the eastern or 
western border and the time when the vessel is expected to have left the NSR after completion 
(Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation, 2013). More information about the latest rules for 
navigation can be found in the “Rules of navigation on the water area of the Northern Sea 
Route”, approved by the Russian Ministry of Transport the 17th January 2013 (Ministry of 
Transport of Russian Federation, 2013). 
Table 2 on page 38 shows the admittance criteria for navigation via the NSR water area based on 
the vessel’s ice class. The navigation period is from July to November (Ministry of Transport of 
Russian Federation, 2013). Vessels with any ice reinforcement and with ice reinforcement 1D 
and 1C are not allowed to sail via the NSR water area in the periods from November to June. 
Vessels without ice reinforcement at all are only allowed to sail via the NSR on open blue water 
(Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation, 2013). The list in Table 3 (p39) shows the existing 
Ice Class LNG fleet in the market with the corresponding new buildings. It is interesting to notice 
that the capacity of the vessels on order (newbuildings) is superior to that of the existing ones. 
If a gas cargo owner, such as TEPN, sees an arbitrage opportunity to transport LNG from 
Hammerfest to Japan via the NSR, it is unlikely that TEPN will easily find an Ice Class 1A, basic 
winterized, NSR approved LNG carrier with an experienced crew on board. The simple reason is 
that there are few Ice Class LNG carriers available in the market for a spot voyage. It would 
therefore be more interesting to enter into a long term TC agreement with a ship owner and make 
use of the arbitrage opportunity when it arises (Lauritzen, 2013).  
1.3.3 Regulations for icebreaking and vessel guiding through the NSR 
 
Icebreaker support ensures the safety of navigation of the ship on the NSR. The current shipping 
companies responsible for escort of vessels in the region are FSUE Atomflot, a state owned 
company, and Far East Shipping Company. The choice is dependent upon whether you are 
sailing west or east. FSUE Atomflot was part of the “Murmansk Shipping Company” until 1988. 
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Every carrier intending to sail via the NSR is subject to pay a tariff for icebreaking service, 
depending on the type of cargo and the amount of cargo (Rosatomflot, 2013). 
 
 
Table 2: Classification of the Ice Classes suitable for a NSR transit  
Source: (CHNL, 2013c) 
“E”  Extreme ice conditions according to the Rosgidromet official information; 
“S”  Severe ice conditions according to the Rosgidromet official information; 
“M”   Moderate ice conditions according to the Rosgidromet official information; 
“L”  Easy ice conditions according to the Rosgidromet official information; 
“+” Navigation is allowed 
“-“ Navigation is not allowed. 
The NSRA indicates in the permit information on the need for icebreaker assistance in a heavy, 
medium and light ice conditions during navigation in the Northern Sea Route water area (CHNL, 
2013d). Place and time of the commencement and completion of the icebreaker support shall be 
agreed by the shipowner with the organization providing icebreaker support services in the NSR 
water area. When approaching the point of formation of a group of vessels to follow the 
icebreakers, which are set up by the organization providing icebreaker support services, the 
vessel sets radio communication with an icebreaker and acts in accordance with the icebreaker 
instructions (CHNL, 2013d). 
E S M L E S M L E S M L E S M L
IN - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IS - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IN - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IS - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IN - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IS - - + + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IN - - - + - - - + - - - + - - - +
IS - + + + - - - + - - - + - - + +
IN - - + + - - - + - - - + - - + +
IS - + + + - - + + - - + + - - + +
IN - + + + - - + + - - + + - - + +
IS - + + + - + + + - + + + - + + +
No
1D
1C
1B
1A
1A Super
Ice reinforcement class 
(Lloyd Register UK)
Ice Navigation mode 
(Independent Navigation - IN, 
with Icebreaker Support - IS)
The Kara Sea
The Laptev 
Sea
The East 
Siberian Sea
The Chukchi 
Sea
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Table 3: Overview of the current Ice Class LNG carrier fleet and new buildings  
Source: (Laurent, 2013) 
Name ICE CLASS Capacity (m3) Year Built Commercial Owner
ANNABELLA 1C 35 491 1975 Chemikalien Seatransport
ARCTIC SPIRIT 1C 89 089 1993 Teekay
CLEAN FORCE 1A 149 700 2008 Dynagas Ltd
CORAL METHANE 1B 7 350 2009 Veder A.
CYGNUS PASSAGE Yes 145 000 2009 Tokyo Electric/NYK/Mitsubishi Corp
ENERGY ADVANCE 1D 147 624 2005 Tokyo Gas
ENERGY FRONTIER 1D 147 599 2003 Tokyo LNG/Mitsui OSK
ENERGY NAVIGATOR 1D 147 558 2008 Tokyo LNG/Mitsui OSK
GRACE BARLERIA Yes 149 700 2007 NYK
GRAND ANIVA 1B 145 000 2008 Sovcomflot/NYK
GRAND ELENA 1B 145 580 2007 Sovcomflot/NYK
GRAND MEREYA 1B 145 963 2008 MOL/Primorsk
HYUNDAI ECOPIA 1C 145 000 2008 Hyundai Merchant Marine
K JASMINE 1C 151 800 2008 Korea Line
LNG DREAM Yes 145 000 2006 Osaka Gas/NYK
LNG JUPITER 1C 155 999 2009 Osaka Gas/NYK
NORMAN LADY 1C 87 600 1973 Mitsui OSK/Hoegh LNG
OB RIVER 1A 149 700 2007 Dynagas Ltd
POLAR SPIRIT 1C 88 996 1993 Teekay
RIBERA DEL DUERO KNUTSEN 1A 173 400 2010 Knutsen O.A.S. Shipping
SCF ARCTIC 1C 71 651 1969 Sovcomflot
SCF POLAR 1C 71 650 1969 Sovcomflot
STENA BLUE SKY 1C 145 700 2006 Stena
STENA CLEAR SKY 1C 171 800 2011 Stena
STENA CRYSTAL SKY 1C 171 800 2011 Stena
SUN ARROWS 1B 19 176 2007 MOL/Hiroshima Gas
DAEWOO 2289 1C 155 900 2013 Awilco LNG
DAEWOO 2290 1C 155 900 2013 Awilco LNG
KAWASAKI 1665 Yes 177 000 2013 NYK
PSKOV 1C 170 200 2014 Sovcomflot
SCF MELAMPUS 1C 170 200 2014 Sovcomflot
SCF MITRE 1C 170 200 2015 Sovcomflot
VELIKIY NOVGOROD 1C 170 200 2013 Sovcomflot
YENISEI RIVER 1A 155 000 2013 Dynagas Ltd
LENA RIVER 1A 155 000 2013 Dynagas Ltd
CLEAN WORLD 1A 155 000 2013 Dynagas Ltd
CLEAN OCEAN 1A 162 000 2014 Dynagas Ltd
CLEAN PLANET 1A 162 000 2014 Dynagas Ltd
HN 2566 1A 162 000 2015 On Offer
HN 2567 1A 162 000 2015 On Offer
New Buildings
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1.4 Preliminary conclusion on the feasibility 
 
The aim of this part was to answer the question of whether sending an LNG shipment via the 
NSR is feasible. The approach used is a more qualitative than a quantitative one. I have come to a 
preliminary conclusion in this paper that shipping LNG via the NSR instead via the Suez Canal is 
feasible from July to November. 
The Arctic sea-ice extent evolution the past years leads to new opportunities of sending 
shipments via the NSR. The Russian authorities’ new measures for attracting shipments on this 
route follow its own path. The unexpected decision from Egyptian authorities to increase the 
Suez Canal toll by 2.5 to 5% from the 1
st
 May 2013 (Tradewinds, 2013) could be a good 
opportunity for Russia to offer competitive icebreaking tariffs and hence attract newcomers on 
the NSR. The fact that Russia should allow Ice Class 1C and 1D vessels to transit via the NSR 
with icebreaking assistance from July to late November, as of before vessels should not be less 
than Ice Class 1A, reinforces new shipping opportunities.  From Table 2 (p38) whenever the ice 
conditions are light, meaning that there is almost no ice at all, the new regulations allow also non-
Ice Class vessels to transit with icebreaking escort with the permission from Rosatomflot. 
Although a transit via the NSR is associated with extra risks, the NSRA’s regulations are robust 
and strict. It should not be a problem to take advantage of sailing via the NSR. In addition, many 
seafarers and ship owners see the pirates along Somalia’s and Vietnam’s coasts and in the Strait 
of Malacca as a serious threat, and probably even more risky?. Consequently, the NSR could 
benefit from its more “pirate safe” image and attract new shipments in the future if the problem 
persists. 
According to Viktor Olerski, Deputy Transport Minister of Russia, in the future, commercial 
attractiveness of transit navigation along the NSR will continue to grow with the development of 
the route’s seaport infrastructure and with the implementation of projects for construction of large 
capacity vessels of Arctic Ice Class (Chernov, 2013). The progress of the Yamal project with the 
world’s biggest Arctic port for gas export in Sabetta and the new buildings list of LNG Ice Class 
carriers from Table 3 (p39) are good indicators of this development. The questions remaining are 
how long it will take to develop this project and when will the first LNG cargo from Yamal 
happen. Will they meet financing problems? Will the project be further postponed? 
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The future of the gas market in Europe is uncertain. Nothing is indicating that the European gas 
prices will rise in the future; they should pursue their fall due to the sharp fall in demand (Figure 
5) (p15). One of the main causes is the unexpected European rise in consumption of coal at a 
lower price than natural gas (Tollaksen, 2013). Terje Martin Halmø, a gas analyst from Terica 
AS, thinks that oil & gas companies such as Statoil in Norway are too focused on the European 
market. 95% of the Norwegian gas infrastructure is linked to European customers wishing to get 
the gas price down as low as possible. According to him, Norway should develop more its LNG 
infrastructure and send more of the gas shipment to Asia instead. He thinks that Norway should 
take advantage of the NSR and see it as a new opportunity to reach the Asian market. More LNG 
plants along the Norwegian coast should be considered to enable gas revenues to be less 
dependent on the European gas market. If nothing is done, Norway can probably lose NOK 20 
billion in annual revenues in the near future (Tollaksen, 2013).  
However, Statoil has recently announced its wish to re-enter the Shtokman project in the Barents 
Sea, in partnership with Gazprom and Total, if a new technology to extract and export the gas is 
envisaged. The most feasible and economic viable solution is to invest in a floating LNG 
terminal, a kind of “floating Melkøya” located over the gas field. With an uncertain gas market in 
Europe, Statoil is opposed to build a long gas pipeline to reach the European market. The cost 
would be too high to bear and there would be a risk to oversupply the continent with gas which 
would make the prices to fall even more from today’s already low level (Helgesen, 2013). 
According to Nikolai Grigoriev from Gazprom who succeeded with the Ob River, the NSR is not 
a highway, but an ‘A’ road. He also recommends for those wishing to sail via the NSR to plan in 
advance and take it seriously because the Arctic doesn’t forgive, you have to treat it with respect. 
He is also ready to do it again; his group has planned and has the experience from 2012. When a 
new opportunities arise, he is ready to execute again he says (Hine, 2013d). Tschudi Shipping 
Company AS, which provides shipping and logistics services with special focus on Russia and 
the Baltic regions, were involved last year with the Ob River’s transit through the NSR. They are 
now saying that they are in close cooperation with Rosatomflot and Dynagas Ltd, the Ob River’s 
ship owner, to send a new LNG cargo for the coming 2013 season (Hagen, 2013). 
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II) A case study: the economic viability of the NSR 
2.1 Purpose of the study 
 
What I have studied so far is the feasibility of the NSR from a qualitative aspect. The aim of next 
part is to have a more quantitative approach by investigating whether it is economically viable or 
not to operate and send a LNG carrier via the NSR. The work will be performed by comparing 
two different shipping routes between Hammerfest in Norway and Yokohama in Japan. One of 
the routes will go via the Northern Sea Route while the other one will pass through the Suez 
Canal. The calculations will be made for two different LNG carriers. The study will be made 
from the LNG trader’s point of view who charters the vessel. 
2.2 Description of the study 
2.2.1 A Voyage Cash Flow Analysis 
 
I will start comparing the profitability of sailing via the NSR with the profitability of sailing 
through the Suez Canal for a single round trip Hammerfest-Yokohama.. The method used for 
each route will be the Voyage Cash Flow (VCF) analysis, again, from the trader’s point of view 
(charterer). In order to better compare the results for each route, I will use an identical LNG 
tanker for each route and perform the calculation a second time using a different LNG tanker for 
both routes. 
- The first one is a fictive Ice Class 1A 150,000 m3 Steam Turbine (ST) basic winterized 
which I will name Polar Bear in the whole dissertation.  
- The second LNG carrier will be a fictive one also; an 180,000 m3 Triple-Fuel Diesel-
Electric (TFDE) Ice Class 1A basic winterized. I will call it the Northern Light 
hereinafter. 
It is interesting to choose these two vessels because of the difference of their engine (ST and 
TFDE), hence of the bunker consumption. Since they are of different size, they belong to 
different market segments; hence the charter rates will differ. The reason for choosing these 
vessels is to understand which of them would be more suitable and cost-effective to charter for 
the trader. Vessels like Polar Bear exist in today’s LNG shipping market while the Northern 
Light does not but might exist in the near future. 
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In October 2012, the first NSR voyage of the Ob River started in ballast from Mizushima (Japan) 
and ended in Hammerfest. Arrived there, the Ob River loaded 134,066 m
3
 LNG in Melkøya and 
performed the voyage back to Tobata in Japan (Lauritzen, 2013). In my case study, the NSR 
round trip will start from Hammerfest where the vessel will be fully loaded with LNG and will 
sail to Yokohama. The LNG cargo will be sold to the Japanese market at the Japan/Korea Spot 
(JKS) price. After unloading the cargo, the same voyage will be made back again to Hammerfest, 
in ballast this time. 
The contract between Gazprom and Dynagas is a long term TC. As for the two LNG carriers 
chartered by TEPN
4
, the TCP of the Ob River is a “Shell LNG Time Charter”. Gazprom pays the 
long term daily TC rate (CAPEX and OPEX) and all voyage related costs (Lauritzen, 2013). For 
the VCF analysis in my case, I will consider a round trip voyage where the trader charters the 
vessel in the spot charter market.   
To make the study more flexible, different sensitivity analyses will be made by varying important 
input variables as the LNG cargo price, the JKS sales price, the nature of the bunker and the 
sailing speed in order to see how these variations will influence the competitiveness of the NSR 
with Suez. 
2.2.2 An Annual Cash Flow analysis 
 
Once the VCF for a round trip has been studied and compared for each route, I will evaluate the 
trader’s results from the Annual Cash Flows (ACFs). For the first ship service, the routine will be 
a simple round trip Hammerfest-Yokohama during the 365 navigable days a year. For the second 
service, the LNG carrier will sail via the NSR during the summer period and will sail via the Suez 
Canal during the rest of the year. The number of possible round trips along the two routes will 
depend on different variables as the shipping speed and the NSR’s number of navigable days per 
year. The cargo lifting dates are scheduled from the number of round trips Hammerfest-
Yokohama the vessel can complete during a year and hence from the expected dates at port. As 
for the VCF analysis, a sensitivity analysis will be carried out varying different input variables. 
 
                                                          
4
 The Meridian Spirit and the Arctic Lady 
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2.2.3 General distance and sailing speed assumptions  
 
A distance Hammerfest-Suez-Yokohama of 12,500 nm will be assumed (Lauritzen, 2013). The 
Suez Canal scenario will be denominated “Suez”. The guaranteed average speed for LNG carriers 
is usually situated between 18 and 20 knots. Because of winds, sometimes rough sea and other 
unpredictable weather conditions, the average sailing speed for “Suez” from Hammerfest to 
Yokohama will be assumed 18 knots, laden as in ballast.  
 
Figure 19: Largest vessels having entered the NSR in 2012 sorted by date of entrance  
Source: (CHNL, 2012) 
The sailing distance between Hammerfest and Yokohama via the NSR is 6,400 nm (Lauritzen, 
2013). Since weather and ice conditions are often hard to predict on this route, the actual sailing 
distance may vary. For simplicity, in the study, the distance will be assumed constant. The NSR 
scenario will be denominated “NSR”. In order to make the model more accurate and flexible, 
“NSR” will be divided into three sections: 
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- The first one goes from Hammerfest to the Kara Strait (section H/K) and the distance is 950 nm. 
On this route section we never see ice formations during summer (Belkin, 2013). Because of the 
Gulf Stream from Florida in the USA, the Barents Sea is guaranteed ice-free during all the year 
(Truc, 2013). Consequently, open blue water will be considered and the average speed assumed 
will be the same as for “Suez”, 18 knots laden as in ballast. 
- The second section is the NSR per definition which starts form the Kara Strait and ends at the 
Bering Strait and vice versa (section K/B). The sailing distance is 2,700 nm. There is typically 
young ice
5
 during summer which is mainly present in the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and 
the Chukchi Sea.  Again, the summer sea-ice extent in these regions varies with the years. 
Furthermore, it is usually on this route section the ice breaking escort lasts. The Arctic summer in 
2012 was exceptional which enabled the Ob River escort to start from the Vilkitsky Strait. In the 
case study, I will assume the escort for the laden voyage to start at the Kara Strait, which is the 
most common, and end at the Bering Strait. For the ballast voyage back again, the ice breaking 
escort will start at the Bering Strait and end at the Kara Strait. The average assumed speed on this 
route section will be 12 knots laden as in ballast. This approximation is based on 2012 historical 
average sailing speeds on the NSR. In order to make the comparison more reliable, I have only 
taken into account the largest carriers (out of the total 46 in 2012) having transported at least 
44,000 tons of cargo. These carriers are figured in Figure 19 (p44) and are sorted by the 
corresponding dates of entrance on the NSR. The graph shows the time spent on the NSR and the 
average sailing speed each vessel performed. It is interesting to observe that the average speed is 
at the highest from the end of August to the end of October, period in which it is optimal to 
transit as the sea-ice extent is at its lowest level (Figure 13) (p27). 
- The third and last route section starts at the Bering Strait and ends in Yokohama (section B/Y) 
and the sailing distance is 2,750 nm. As for the H/K section, this sea is free of ice during summer 
(Belkin, 2013) and consequently the average sailing speed will be assumed 18 knots as well, 
laden as in ballast. 
With the mentioned speed and distances in mind we can calculate the number of days it takes for 
a round trip Hammerfest-Yokohama under each scenario. I assume a direct service line without 
any stops along the route. The waiting and transit time combined for the Suez Canal is assumed 
                                                          
5
 Young ice refers to ice with a tickness varying generally from 10 cm to 30 cm 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 46 - 
 
to be one day and the time necessary for planning a NSR transit is made preliminary to the 
voyage. The numbers of days at port are not taken into consideration as they are the same 
irrespective to the route taken. Table 4 gives us the results. 
Route “Suez” “NSR” 
Distance Hammerfest - Yokohama (nm) 12,500 6,400 
Distance Hammerfest - Kara Strait (nm) - 950 
Distance Kara Strait - Bering Strait (nm) - 2,700 
Distance Bering Strait - Yokohama (nm) - 2,750 
  
  
Number of sailing days Hammerfest - Kara Strait (days) - 2.20 
Number of sailing days Kara Strait - Bering Strait (days) - 9.38 
Number of sailing days Bering Strait – Yokohama (days) - 6.37 
Waiting and transit time through the Suez Canal (days) 1 - 
   
Total number of sailing days Hammerfest-Yokohama 29,94 17.94 
Number of sailing days for a round trip* 59,87 35.88 
 
Table 4: The number of sailing days 
where 
                       
             
                
                              
 
                                                                                
 
It is worth to notice that the number of sailing days on the NSR of 9.38 days (section K-B) is a 
good approximation. If we take the average from the numbers in Figure 19, we get an overall 
average sailing speed of 9.05 days for 2012.  
2.3 The Voyage Cash Flow model 
2.3.1 The vessels’ bunker consumption 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 show respectively the bunker consumption for the Northern Light and the 
Polar Bear. The data for the Northern Light are taken from the 165,000 m
3
 TFDE Meridian 
Spirit chartered by TEPN. There are several reasons for why these numbers represent a good 
approximation for the Northern Light. First of all, an 180,000 m
3
 TFDE LNG carrier doesn’t 
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exist in today’s shipping market and bunker consumption numbers are hard to get. TEPN believes 
that the technology improvements rely today principally in more bunker efficient vessels. They 
believe that today’s TFDE technology improvements would make a new 180,000 m3 TFDE LNG 
carrier’s bunker consumption comparable to the 2010 built 165,000 m3 TFDE Meridian Spirit. 
The fact that the fictive Northern Light is Ice Class while the Meridian Spirit is not, will not 
affect the bunker consumption dramatically.  It is wrong to think that Ice Class vessels are 
heavier than conventional ones, they are not ice breakers. The difference in bunker consumption 
relies principally in the form of the propellers and on the hull’s hydrodynamics (Laurent, 2013). I 
will assume that the Northern Light is similar to the Meridian Spirit in terms hull design, 
hydrodynamics and propellers; although it can carry 15,000 m
3
 more LNG. Consequently, for the 
reasons just mentioned, I will assume the bunker consumption of the Northern Light to be the 
same as of the Meridian Spirit in my model. For similar reasons, data for the Polar Bear are 
taken from the Arctic Lady.  
A TFDE vessel can either burn marine gas oil, heavy fuel oil or LNG. The decision of choosing 
the nature of bunker will entirely depend on what is the cheapest for the trader. The consumption 
rates remain the key variable for traders contracting those vessels (Hine, 2013e). I will assume 
that the vessels run with LNG, expressed in BOG (Boil-Off-Gas). A case where the vessels run 
with fuel oil will also be studied later in order to see what would be the most cost efficient for the 
trader. 
Northern Light Ballast  Laden  
Speed (Knots) 
FOE/day BOG/day FOE/day BOG/day 
mt m
3
 mt m
3
 
19,5 137 263 142 273 
19 134 257 136 261 
18,5 127 244 126 242 
18 120 230 117 224 
17,5 114 219 109 210 
17 109 209 101 195 
16 99 190 88 168 
15 89 171 79 151 
14 82 158 69 132 
13 76 145 63 120 
12 70 135 57 110 
 
Table 5: Overview of the Northern Light’s bunker consumption volumes respective to speed  
Source: (Laurent, 2013)  
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Polar Bear Ballast Laden 
Speed (Knots) 
HFO/day BOG/day HFO/day BOG/day 
mt m
3
 mt m
3
 
19,5 180 360 195 390 
19 165 330 180 360 
18,5 150 300 165 330 
18 135 270 150 300 
17,5 130 260 145 290 
17 125 250 140 280 
16,5 120 240 135 270 
16 115 230 130 260 
15 105 210 120 240 
14 95 190 110 220 
13 85 170 100 200 
12 75 150 90 180 
11 65 130 80 160 
10 55 110 70 140 
8 53 105 55 110 
 
Table 6: Overview of the Polar Bear’s bunker consumption volumes respective to speed  
Source: (Laurent, 2013) 
In order to have a better overview of the consumption schemes, I drew the curves in Figure 20 
representing the daily BOG as function of speed for the TFDE Northern Light and the ST Polar 
Bear. 
 
Figure 20: Representation of the LNG bunker consumption rates as function of sailing speed 
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HFO/day and FOE/day correspond to the daily “Heavy Fuel Oil” and “Fuel Oil Equivalent” 
expressed in metric tons (mt). The LNG bunker consumption expressed in m
3
 is given by the 
daily BOG. TEPN uses 1 mt = 2 m
3
 as a good approximation for converting HFO/day or 
FOE/day into BOG/day. For that reason, the same will be used in the calculations and I will not 
go into further details behind this equality. 
The main reason for the atypical consumption characteristic of the Northern Light relies on the 
design of the ship´s hull, which has been optimized for the laden conditions and the TFDE 
propulsion at 18.5 knots. When the carrier is fully laden the vessel´s displacement makes the 
hull´s bulbous bow totally submerged and the hydrodynamics optimal at 18.5 knots. When the 
vessel is on ballast, the displacement is less, meaning that the hull´s bulbous bow is less efficient 
as well as the hydrodynamics, with an adverse effect resulting in an increase of consumption 
below 18.5 knots of speed. However below 18.5 knots, on ballast conditions, the hydrodynamics 
could be improved by trimming the vessel by ahead, but this action would also be detrimental to 
the ship´s propeller efficiency (Laurent, 2013). 
For the Polar Bear’s case, we observe a more traditional shape of the curve with a vessel 
consuming more bunker laden than in ballast. We notice that all in all the 180,000 m
3
 TFDE 
Northern Light is more bunker efficient than the 150,000 m
3
 ST Polar Bear.  
It is worth to point out that the incremental bunker consumption under ice conditions during 
summer can be disregarded. The main reason is that the vessels in my case will always be 
escorted by Russian ice breakers leading the route. Hence, the channel created by the ice breakers 
is made of broken sea-ice (Figure 15 & Figure 16, p33). It is also worth to emphasize on the fact 
that it will neither be the cargo owner’s nor the ship owner’s intention to break the ice. Secondly, 
the two players will always avoid taking unnecessary extra risk of breaking the ice. Lastly, an Ice 
Class vessel, whether it is 1C, 1B or 1A, is designed for first year ice and for broken sea-ice, not 
for breaking the sea-ice as it is specified in Table 1 (p31). The Polar Bear and the Northern Light 
are not ice breakers. 
2.3.2 The shipping revenues 
 
The Polar Bear has an exact LNG cargo capacity of 146,791 m
3
. I know that the Ob River 
arrived in Tobata the 5
th
 December 2012. The JKS price from the beginning of December 2012 
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was around 16 USD/mmBtu and I will be content myself with this value as a source of revenue 
for the trader (Laurent, 2013). The fact that the destination is Yokohama in the model has no 
impact on the JKS sales price.  
Table 7 shows the trader’s net shipping revenue for a fully laden vessel:  
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
   -LNG cargo volume (m
3
) 146,791 146,791 180,000 180,000 
   -LNG burned during transport (m
3
) 17,063 7,976 13,595 6,178 
   -Net LNG volume for sale (m
3
) 129,728 138,815 166,405 173,822 
   -Net LNG volume for sale (mmBtu)* 3,009,688 3,220,515 3,860,605 4,032,662 
   -JKS Gas sales price (USD/mmBtu) 16 16 16 16 
Trader’s Net Shipping Revenue (USD) 48,155,013 51,528,241 61,769,683 64,522,600 
 
*Conversion factor 23.2 mmBtu/m
3
. 
Table 7: The shipping revenue 
As already mentioned before, both vessels operate at the same speed laden as in ballast for the 
round trip, thus 
                                 
 
                               
 
                                                        
 
For the Polar Bear’s NSR voyage round trip, the LNG bunker consumption is 7,976 m3, given 
the speeds assumed of 18 knots on sections H-K and B-Y and 12 knots on K-B (NSR). This leads 
to a net cargo volume for sale in Yokohama of 138,815 m
3
. For “Suez”, since the sailing distance 
is approximately twice as long, of course more bunker will be consumed explaining the lower net 
LNG volumes for sale.  
From the cargo owner’s perspective, since the LNG is taken from the cargo volume transported, 
the marginal cost of burning LNG will depend on the LNG delivery price to Yokohama. Hence, 
the trader values the marginal LNG bunker cost via Suez as a cost of 16 USD/mmBtu since the 
marginal volume burned could have been sold to the Japanese market.  
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Given a same sales price of 16 USD/mmBtu, the Northern Light will generate more revenues 
than the Polar Bear since it has a higher cargo capacity and it is more bunker efficient. 
2.3.3 The shipping costs 
2.3.3.a)  The hire cost 
 
The Polar Bear is atypical in the LNG shipping market since the tanker is Ice Class 1A and there 
are few of them (Table 3, p 39). The Northern Light is even more out of the ordinary, since a 
vessel of this size and Ice Class 1A doesn’t exist. We can find neither weekly nor monthly market 
reports given the spot charter rates for Ice Class LNG carriers. This can probably be explained by 
the fact that the number of Ice Class LNG carriers is small among conventional ones. There is not 
a clear defined market for those carriers. Whenever a vessel as the Polar Bear is available in the 
spot charter market for a short period of time, something rare since the vast majority of these 
vessels are in long term TC hire, the rate is often purely negotiated between the ship owner and 
the cargo owner. The spot rate is more than a simple supply and demand equilibrium. The ship 
owner will not hesitate to push the price up when bargaining with the charterer. This is especially 
true when the cargo owner wishes to charter the vessel for the NSR purpose. Since the ship 
owner sees there an additional risk and at the same time a cost advantage of sailing via the NSR 
instead via the Suez Canal, he will not hesitate to take a part of the profit by pushing the freight 
rate up (Laurent, 2013). 
In the case study, an average spot charter rate of 122,000 USD/day will be considered for the 
Polar Bear, which is the average rate from August to November 2012 for a conventional 155,000 
m
3
 LNG (RS Platou, 2012).  
For the Northern Light, reports on charter rates for 180,000 m
3
 LNG carriers cannot be found, not 
to mention for Ice Class vessels. Despite that, it is possible to give rough estimates of the average 
spot charter rates for a 145,000 m
3
 ST and 165,000 m
3
 Dual-Fuel Diesel-Electric (DFDE) LNG 
vessels from August to November 2012. These were approximately respectively equal to 120,000 
USD/day and 140,000 USD/day according to Fearnley LNG (2013). I will therefore assume that 
the spot charter rate difference between an 180,000 m
3
 TFDE and the 165,000 m
3
 DFDE is equal 
to the spot charter rate difference of USD 20,000 per day between the 165,000 m
3
 DFDE and 
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145,000 m
3
 ST. Hence, a good approximation of the spot charter rate for the Northern Light 
could have been 160,000 USD/day between August and November 2012.  
Table 8 below shows the sum of the hire costs the trader would have to bear for a round trip spot 
voyage under each route. 
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
-Daily Spot Charter Rate (USD/day) 122,000 122,000 160,000 160,000 
-Number of sailing days for a round trip* 59.87 35.88 59.87 35.88 
Sum trader’s Hire Cost for a round trip (USD) 7,304,185 4,377,315 9,579,259 5,740,741 
 
*The number of days at port is not taken into consideration  
Table 8: The hire cost 
 2.3.3.b)  The LNG cargo cost 
 
Since the trader is assumed not to be a partner of Snøhvit, the LNG seller may charge him the 
NBP price plus a certain premium for the LNG. Thus, due to lack of information, I will assume 
the price paid by the charterer to be 12 USD/mmBtu which can be seen as a realistic 
approximation. This price takes into account the NBP price of 10 USD/mmBtu (Laurent, 2013) 
from November 2012 and a premium of 2 USD/mmBtu to the LNG seller. The table bellow gives 
an estimation of the LNG cargo cost for the trader, assuming a fully laden vessel. 
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
   -LNG cargo volume (m
3
) 146,791 146,791 180,000 180,000 
   -LNG cargo cost (USD/mmBtu) 12 12 12 12 
Trader’s total LNG cargo cost (USD) 40,866,614 40,866,614 50,112,000 50,112,000 
 
Table 9: The LNG cargo cost 
where 
                                    
                                                                                 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 53 - 
 
2.3.3.c)  The Voyage costs 
 
                                                
For the Suez scenario, the Suez Canal costs involve channel dues, light dues, immigration 
clearance, mooring/unmooring, pilotage, port clearance fees and port sundries. The insurances 
take into account the Suez insurance, the extra risk insurance premiums related to the CTA 
(Conditional Trading Area) & IRTC (International Recommended Transit Corridor).  
For the NSR scenario the Polar Bear requires an extra LNG consumption of 4 mt per day for the 
winterization (Lauritzen, 2013). We will assume this rate to be the same for the Northern Light. 
As for the LNG bunker cost, the winterization cost is valued at the JKS price of 16 USD/mmBtu. 
The price is assumed to be the same for the laden and in ballast voyage. They are calculated only 
for the K/B route section with the following formula: 
                                       
                                                                            
             
The commercial agency costs include the approval cost from the NSRA, the support pre, during 
and post NSR voyage. For a first voyage along the NSR it costs USD 30,000. For subsequent 
voyages the cost is USD 15,000 (Lauritzen, 2013). They are assumed equal for both vessels. 
For the Polar Bear and the Northern Light, I have assumed the 2013 Suez Canal tariffs to be 
equal to those for the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit. They can be found in Appendix B & 
C. 
The NSR tariff eastbound, when the Polar Bear is laden, is estimated from the cost Gazprom 
paid in November 2012 for the Ob River, which was approximately USD 325,000 (USD 5 per ton 
cargo according to Rosatomflot). Since the vessel at that time was not fully laden (134,066 m
3
 
given a max cargo capacity of 146,791 m
3
), I have adjusted the NSR tariff since my study 
assumes a fully laden tanker. This gives us a NSR tariff of: 
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For the voyage back again in ballast, the Polar Bear’s NSR tariff is based on the actual cost paid 
in 2012 by the Gazprom for the Ob River; a USD 2.5 per ton of displacement which gave a total 
of USD 222,500,  
Regarding the Northern Light, the NSR tariff of the vessel laden is calculated from the 5 USD per 
ton cargo giving 
            
        
                                          
The NSR tariff for the Northern Light in ballast is based on the ton of displacement of 113,609 
mt from the Meridian Spirit and the tariff of 2.5 USD per ton of displacement giving 
                                                       
 
The cost for anti-fouling afloat for the NSR scenario is considered in the voyage costs although it 
is not a requirement for every transit. For the Polar Bear purpose, they decided to carry out anti 
fouling on the vessel’s hull due to the scraping of broken sea-ice. This was made afloat and did 
not require dry docking. It cost USD 15,000 (Lauritzen, 2013). Since the Northern Light is of 
higher volume, I assume a cost of USD 20,000 for the anti fouling afloat. 
Port dues are based on data provided from TEPN for the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit and 
are assumed to be the same for the Polar Bear and the Northern Light. The details behind the port 
dues can be found in Appendix B & C as I will not go into further details of the cost elements. 
The exchange rate taken into account to convert NOK into USD is 5.79 NOK/USD. 
When the route goes via the Suez Canal, the insurance costs the trader USD 65,000. It takes into 
account the Suez Canal insurance, a crew bonus and war risk insurance. The insurance cost is the 
same for both vessels regardless if they transit the canal laden or in ballast. Whenever the vessels 
sail via the NSR, the trader pays the same amount of USD 65,000 as for Suez but including this 
time an insurance premium of USD 95,000; the approximated amount Gazprom paid in 
November 2012 for the Ob River. This gives a total NSR insurance of USD 160,000 laden as in 
ballast. 
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From Table 10, what we first observe is that the voyage costs for the Polar Bear (excluded LNG 
bunker costs) are somewhat higher for “Suez” than for “NSR” by USD 16,367. For the Northern 
Light, “NSR” is more costly than “Suez” given the assumptions taken.  
 
*The cost does not take into account travel expenses for the pilots. 
**The cost is only paid for the first voyage. 
***The agent disch port costs are from the port of Futsu, assumed equivalent for Yokohama. 
Table 10: The voyage costs 
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
Extra LNG consumption for winterization Laden - 27,840 - 27,840 
Extra LNG consumption for winterization Ballast - 27,840 - 27,840 
 
      
Agent and Surveyor Load port Hammerfest 219,859 219,859 206,450 206,450 
 
      
Transit fee Suez Canal Southbound laden 502,591 - 439,068 - 
Transit fee Canal Northbound ballast 433,304 - 380,018 - 
 
      
Commercial Agency cost (NSR approval and voyage support) Laden - 30,000 - 30,000 
Commercial Agency cost (NSR approval and voyage support) Ballast - 15,000 - 15,000 
 
      
Ice pilotage Laden (2 pilots), USD 600 per pilot per day* - 11,250 - 11,250 
Ice pilotage Ballast (2 pilots), USD 600 per pilot per day* - 11,250 - 11,250 
 
      
NSR Tariff Eastbound (Laden)  5 USD/ton of cargo - 355,848 - 450,000 
NSR Tariff Westbound (Ballast)  2.5 USD/ton of displacement - 222,500 - 284,023 
 
      
Cost for anti-fouling painting afloat - 15,000 - 20,000 
Extra communication equipment for NSR (NBDP)** - 5,000 - 5,000 
Cost for two sets of Russian charts** - 8,000 - 8,000 
 
      
Suez Insurance + War risk Insurance + Crew Bonus Laden 65,000 - 65,000 - 
Suez Insurance + War risk Insurance + Crew Bonus Ballast 65,000 - 65,000 - 
 
      
NSR Insurance Laden - 160,000 - 160,000 
NSR Insurance Ballast - 160,000 - 160,000 
 
      
Agent and Surveyor Disch port Yokohama*** 108,831 108,831 105,378 105,378 
Sum Voyage Costs (USD) 1,394,585 1,378,218 1,260,914 1,522,031 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 56 - 
 
2.3.4 The Voyage Cash Flow results 
 2.3.4.a)  Computing the results 
 
Let’s recall the assumptions I have made. I assumed a sailing speed is 18 knots on open blue 
water and 12 knots for the NSR (route section K/B) for both vessels, laden as in ballast. The 
freight rate is assumed to be USD 122,000 per day for the Polar Bear and USD 160,000 for the 
Northern Light. The cargo cost for the trader in Hammerfest is estimated to 12 USD/mmBtu and 
the JKS selling price in Yokohama is 16 USD/mmBtu. Given the distances of 12,500 nm via 
Suez and 6,400 nm through the NSR, and knowing the BOG rate is taken from the cargo volume 
and thus valued at the JKS price, I have come to the following results for each vessel: 
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
Trader’s Net Shipping Revenue (USD) 48,155,013 51,528,241 61,769,683 64,522,600 
   -Sum Hire Cost for a round trip (USD) 7,304,185 4,377,315 9,579,259 5,740,741 
   -Trader’s total LNG cargo cost (USD) 40,866,614 40,866,614 50,112,000 50,112,000 
   -Sum Voyage Cost (USD) 1,394,585 1,378,218 1,260,914 1,522,031 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD) -1,410,372 4,906,095 817,510 7,147,828 
Net LNG volume for sale (mmBtu) 3,009,688 3,220,515 3,860,605 4,032,662 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD/mmBtu) -0.47 1.52 0.21 1.77 
   -Broker’s Commission (USD/mmBtu) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD/mmBtu) -0.57 1.42 0.11 1.67 
 
Table 11: The Voyage Cash Flows with LNG as bunker 
 2.3.4.b)  General comments  
 
Given a commission to the broker of 0.10 USD/mmBtu, the Suez route would give a net loss of 
0.57 USD/mmBtu for the charterer of the Polar Bear and a net profit of 0.11 USD/mmBtu for the 
charterer of the Northern Light. The NSR route would give a net profit of 1.42 USD/mmBtu for 
the Polar Bear’s charterer and a net profit of 1.67 USD/mmBtu for the Northern Light’s 
charterer. It would not be profitable to sail via the Suez Canal for the Polar Bear given that the 
assumptions I have taken are correct. All in all, it would be more profitable to take the NSR than 
sailing through the Suez Canal. The savings for the trader from sailing via the NSR when looking 
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at these numbers cannot be ignored. We notice for both vessels that the savings from choosing 
the NSR instead of Suez rely principally in the hire cost and the bunker cost. 
These preliminary results inform us also about the advantages of sailing with a Triple-Fuel 
Diesel-Electric LNG carrier. The main driver of the positive results for TFDE carriers is the 
lower bunker consumption rates relative to Steam Turbine carriers. The combination of higher 
transported volumes and the lower consumption leads to increased net shipping revenues. For the 
NSR, the Northern Light in my case would generate around USD 13 million in extra revenues for 
a single round trip compared to the Polar Bear. There is no doubt that oil & gas companies would 
care about economies of scale and the bunker consumption given these results. They would have 
rather chosen the TFDE Northern Light than the ST Polar Bear for both routes. 
Typically, brokers compete and can accept a commission of USD 100,000 per voyage or 
sometimes USD 50,000. Some may accept even a negative commission for their first NSR 
voyage in hope of being better placed to gather future contracts on this strategic passage 
(Laurent, 2013). 
 2.3.4.c)  A case with traditional fuel oil bunker 
 
In the VCF model I have chosen LNG as bunker and valued the bunker cost to the JKS price in 
Japan at 16 USD/mmBtu. It is interesting to compare the cost if the Northern Light runs with 
Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) instead. For an average speed between Hammerfest and Yokohama via the 
NSR approximated to 15 knots
6
 and for a fully laden vessel, the daily BOG costs the trader: 
                                                                           
If the vessel ran with HFO and the bunker price was 630 USD/mt, the daily bunker would cost 
the trader: 
                                                           
It would have been more economical for trader of the Northern Light to run with traditional fuel 
oil in this case since the daily savings represent USD 6,521.  
                                                          
6
 The speed of 15 knots is estimated from the weighted average of 18 knots on sections H/K & B/Y and 12 knots on 
K/B, the NSR. 
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What should the bunker prices be for the trader in order to be indifferent between the two types 
of bunker? Keeping LNG bunker cost and other parameters constant, the break even HFO cost is 
713.12 USD/mt. Keeping the fuel bunker cost and other parameters constant; the break even 
BOG cost is 14.13 USD/mmBtu. 
For the Polar Bear‘s case, supposing the same prices as before, a fully laden vessel, and an 
average speed of 15 knots between Hammerfest and Yokohama via the NSR, the daily BOG 
costs the trader: 
                                                                          
If the vessel runs with HFO as bunker, taking a bunker price of 630 USD/tone, the daily bunker 
would cost him: 
                                                           
This gives daily savings of USD 13,488 for the Polar Bear, even more than the Northern Light. 
What would the VCF’s be if the vessels ran with HFO instead?  
We see in Table 12 that the trader increases the VCFs although the Polar Bear via the Suez Canal 
would have still generated a loss, but a slighter one than before.  
 
ST Polar Bear TFDE Northern Light 
Route “Suez” “NSR” “Suez” “NSR” 
 Trader’s Shipping Revenue (USD) 54,488,819 54,488,819 66,816,000 66,816,000 
   -Bunker cost at 630 USD/mt 5,374,829 2,542,995 4,462,051 1,894,249 
   -Sum Hire Cost for a round trip (USD) 7,304,185 4,377,315 9,579,259 5,740,741 
   -Trader’s total LNG cargo cost (USD) 40,866,614 40,866,614 50,112,000 50,112,000 
   -Sum Voyage Cost (USD) 1,394,585 1,378,218 1,260,914 1,522,031 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD) -451,394 5,323,677 1,401,776 7,546,979 
LNG volume for sale (mmBtu) 3,405,551 3,405,551 4,176,000 4,176,000 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD/mmBtu) -0.13 1.56 0.34 1.81 
   -Broker’s Commission (USD/mmBtu) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Trader’s Voyage Cash Flow (USD/mmBtu) -0.23 1.46 0.24 1.71 
 
Table 12: The Voyage Cash Flows with fuel oil as bunker 
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This time the trader’s shipping revenue is calculated from the full LNG capacity of the vessels 
(respectively 146.791 m
3
 and 180,000 m
3
). 
The trader’s bunker costs for a round trip Hammerfest-Yokohama are calculated as follows: 
Polar Bear via Suez at 18 knots:                                           
Polar Bear via NSR at 15 knots:                                   
Northern Light via Suez at 18 knots:                                   
Northern Light via NSR at 15 knots:                                 
 
The voyage costs are assumed the same as before. For simplification, I did not adjust the extra 
cost for winterization via the NSR to 630 USD/mt since the adjustment would give little 
difference. I kept it as before at USD 27,840.  
The results under BOG and fuel oil give us a preliminary idea of the potential savings that can be 
reached for the trader when conditions are ideal, which is not always the case. It is therefore 
important to do some sensitivity analysis by varying input variables as gas prices, speed and 
freight rates in order to see how the results will be affected. 
2.3.5 A VCF sensitivity analysis 
 
In this part, I will content myself with the BOG rate valued at the JKS price and disregard the 
fuel oil bunker case. 
 2.3.5.a)  Varying the cargo cost and the JKS price 
 
It is interesting to observe how the cargo cost and the JKS price can influence the results from 
Table 11 (p56). The following Table 13 to 16 show the USD/mmBtu VCFs by varying the cargo 
cost and JKS from one extreme to another. I have chosen an interval from 1 to 15 USD/mmBtu 
for the cargo cost and 1 from 20 USD/mmBtu for the JKS sales price. We have two kinds of 
LNG carriers and two different routes giving a total of four matrices. The numbers marked in red 
represent the results I found from the previous calculations in Table 11 (p56). 
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It is worth to point out that if the trader was partner of Snøhvit, the LNG cargo would cost him 
much less than 12 USD/mmBtu. If that was the case, the trader would generate a higher profit. 
Since the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit are not Ice Class, the NSR can represent an 
interesting opportunity to TEPN for LNG exports to Asia if they charter an Ice Class vessel in the 
spot charter market for instance. The Northern Light, if it existed, could have been a good choice 
for them. 
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Table 13 (left) and Table 14 (right):  Gas price sensitivities for the Polar Bear 
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Table 15 (left) and Table 16(right): Gas price sensitivities for the Northern Light 
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What we observe in Table 13 to 16 is that the numbers follow a linear path whether one is 
reading horizontally or vertically in the tables, which seems logical since the JKS and the cargo 
price are the only parameters allowed to vary. 
According to the numbers, one thing for sure is that the NSR will always be more profitable than 
the Suez Canal route. With minimum risks during September month with almost ice free waters, 
a trader wishing to send a LNG shipment from Norway to Asia-Pacific should see the NSR as 
valuable in terms of savings compared to the Suez Canal route. The potential savings when 
comparing the results between “NSR” and “Suez” vary between 1 and 1.8 USD/mmBtu 
depending on where we place ourselves in the tables. Given that the Northern Light for instance 
delivers roughly 4 million mmBtus’ in a single voyage means that the potential extra revenues 
compared to Suez can represent an amount situated between USD 4 million and USD 7.2 million. 
With these numbers, we can also say that a TFDE LNG carrier is more economical than a 
standard ST LNG carrier. Moreover it is interesting to observe that with a 4 USD/mmBtu margin 
between the JKS of 16 USD/mmBtu and the cargo cost of 12 USD/mmBtu, the results for the 
Northern Light are in the positive zone indeed, but close to the negative zone. A drop in the JKS 
price to 14 USD/mmBtu for instance knowing that the trader paid 12 USD/mmBtu for its cargo 
would have given a net loss of -1.89 USD/mmBtu for “Suez” and -0.33 USD/mmBtu for “NSR”. 
Hence, the question to ask ourselves is whether the trader/charterer would take the risk or not to 
ship the LNG at the price levels in red we have assumed. 
When subtracting for each route the matrix table of the Northern Light with the corresponding 
table of the Polar Bear, we get a new table expressing the incremental profit of the Northern 
Light on the Polar Bear. Each line in the new tables will give the same results because of 
linearity. However, when having a look at the columns, we observe that the incremental profit of 
the Northern Light on the Polar Bear increases with the LNG cargo cost for both routes as we 
can see in Figure 21. The “Suez” curve increases faster than the “NSR” curve because of the 
longer sailing distance. What we can deduce from that is that the higher the LNG cargo price, the 
higher is the incremental profit of the Northern Light on the Polar Bear. The choice of the 
Northern Light for shipping becomes more evident the higher the incremental profit. The graph 
shows us a result of economies of scale. 
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Figure 21: Incremental profit of the Northern Light on the Polar Bear as function of the LNG cargo price 
2.3.5.b)  Varying the average sailing speed on the NSR 
 
In the following two tables, I have plotted the trader’s VCFs (expressed in USD/mmBtu) for the 
“NSR” scenario by varying the two speed parameters and keeping the other parameters constant. 
Polar Bear Average sailing speed (knots) Kara Strait-Bering Strait (NSR) 
Average 
sailing 
speed 
(knots) H/K 
and B/Y 
 
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 
12 0,81 1,05 1,11 1,17 1,21 1,25 1,28 
13 0,87 1,11 1,17 1,23 1,27 1,31 1,34 
14 0,92 1,16 1,22 1,28 1,32 1,36 1,39 
15 0,96 1,20 1,27 1,32 1,37 1,40 1,44 
16 1,00 1,24 1,31 1,36 1,40 1,44 1,48 
16,5 1,02 1,26 1,32 1,38 1,42 1,46 1,49 
17 1,03 1,28 1,34 1,39 1,44 1,48 1,51 
17,5 1,05 1,29 1,36 1,41 1,45 1,49 1,53 
18 1,06 1,31 1,37 1,42 1,47 1,51 1,54 
18,5 1,04 1,28 1,35 1,40 1,45 1,49 1,52 
19 1,02 1,26 1,33 1,38 1,43 1,47 1,50 
 
Table 17: Polar Bear sensitivity analysis of the VCF in USD/mmBtu 
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Northern Light Average sailing speed (knots) Kara Strait-Bering Strait (NSR) 
Average sailing 
speed (knots) H/K 
and B/Y 
 
12 13 14 15 
12 1,40 1,45 1,50 1,54 
13 1,47 1,53 1,58 1,61 
14 1,54 1,59 1,64 1,68 
15 1,58 1,64 1,69 1,73 
16 1,62 1,68 1,73 1,77 
17 1,65 1,71 1,76 1,79 
17,5 1,66 1,72 1,77 1,80 
18 1,67 1,73 1,78 1,81 
18,5 1,68 1,74 1,78 1,82 
19 1,68 1,74 1,79 1,83 
 
Table 18: Northern Light sensitivity analysis of the VCF in USD/mmBtu 
It is particularly useful to study the curves’ shape in order to see how the VCFs vary with speed. 
In Figure 22 below, I have chosen two columns from each table and figured the VCFs as function 
of average sailing speed on the sections H/K and B/Y. This is done for a given speed on route 
section K/B (Kara Strait to Bering Strait) that I have chosen to be 12 and 14 knots. It is worth to 
recall that H/K stands for route section “Hammerfest – Kara Strait” and B/Y for “Bering Strait-
Yokohama” 
 
The first thing we notice is the difference in the curves’ shape between the two LNG carriers. The 
more bunker efficient Northern Light gives better results than the Polar Bear and the VCFs are 
maximized at a maximum speed of 19 knots, given that all other parameters are hold constant.  
However, for the Polar Bear, keeping all other parameters constant, the trader would maximize 
its VCF by maintaining a constant speed of 18 knots on sections H/K and B/Y. At a speed level 
above 18 knots, the trader would reach a lower VCF compared to the 18 knots level. This effect 
is due to the higher BOG rates the more you speed up. Although you are moving faster and taking 
fewer days to reach destination when speeding up, the bunker consumption rate, hence bunker 
cost, become too high which in terms will have a negative effect on the VCF. 
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Figure 22: Trader’s VCFs as function of sailing speed on H/K and B/Y 
 
2.4 The Annual Cash Flow model 
2.4.1 Preliminary assumptions 
 
In this part, I will analyze the trader’s cash flows on annual basis supposing that we have 365 
sailing days a year. For the Suez Canal route, based on the sailing distance Hammerfest-
Yokohama of 12,500 nm, the sailing speed and the number of days at port, I will be able to find 
the number of round trips that can be performed annually.  
For “NSR”, the voyages will be made via the NSR during summer and via the Suez Canal during 
the remaining days of the year. The word “summer” can be regarded as somewhat ambiguous in 
an Arctic context. We know for instance that the number of exact navigable days along the NSR 
varies over the years because of several factors such as temperature and the sea-ice extent.  I will 
therefore study three different scenarios where the NSR is open for navigation during 
respectively 90 days per year under the worth case scenario, 120 days per year under base case 
and 150 days per year under the best case.  
1,10 
1,20 
1,30 
1,40 
1,50 
1,60 
1,70 
1,80 
1,90 
12 13 14 15 16 17 17,5 18 18,5 19 
N
e
t 
V
C
F 
(U
SD
/m
m
B
tu
) 
Sailing Speed on H/K and B/Y (knots) 
Northern Light K/B 12 knots 
Polar Bear K/B 12 knots 
Northern Light K/B 14 knots 
Polar Bear K/B 14 knots 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 67 - 
 
First and foremost, I will assume a constant sailing speed on the routes for every round trip. 
Speeds will be assumed equal as in the VCF model in section 2.2.3. 
For every round trip, the number of days at port in Hammerfest and Yokohama are respectively 2 
days, which gives a total number of 4 days at port per round trip. 
I assume that the tankers have neither dry docking days nor stops along the routes during the 
year. The waiting and transit time combined through the Suez Canal is assumed to be one day as 
before. Given the distances we have, I have summed up the number of round trips in Table 19. 
Route "Suez" "NSR" 
Navigable days per year 365 365 
NSR Navigable days per year N.A 90 120 150 
Number of round trips per year via NSR - 2.26 3.01 3,76 
Number of round trips per year via Suez - 4.31 3.84 3,37 
Number of round trips per year 5.71 6.56 6.84 7,13 
 
Table 19: Number of sailing days 
For “Suez” it is straight forward to find the theoretical number of round trips per year given the 
assumptions above: 
                               
         
 
          
            
             
                             
                                                                                        
                                                                    
         
                   
      
 
For “NSR” when the NSR is open for 120 navigable days a year, the number of round trips per 
year can be found by following: 
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The same calculations are done for 90 and 150 navigable days via the NSR. In the denominator, 
what I take is the number of days for a round trip without port days from section 2.2.3 and I add 
the 4 days at port since this will affect the number of round trips per year. 
2.4.2 Costs assumptions 
 
The main differences this time compared to the VCF analysis is the nature of the charter 
agreement. In the Voyage Cash Flow analysis, I supposed that the Polar Bear and the Northern 
Light were chartered for a spot voyage round trip at respectively 122,000 USD/day and 160,000 
USD/day.  
 
When analyzing the Annual Cash Flows (ACFs), I will assume that the LNG carriers are 
chartered in a long term Time Charter (TC) as the Arctic Lady and the Meridian Spirit. The long 
term TC rates include the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and the operating expenditures (OPEX). 
This time, I will not chose a fix rate for each vessel and do the calculations step by step again, as 
I did in the VCF model, to we find the ACFs. I will instead go directly to the sensitivities by 
choosing different rates. For the 150,000 m
3
 ST Polar Bear, I have chosen three different TC 
rates (CAPEX+OPEX); respectively 100,000 USD/day, 130,000 USD/day and 160,000 
USD/day. For the 180,000 m
3
 TFDE Northern Light, since the vessel is of higher capacity and 
thus belongs to a different market segment, I have chosen three different charter rates; 
respectively 120,000 USD/day, 150,000 USD/day and 180,000 USD/day. 
A sensitivity analysis will also be considered for the gas prices. Concerning the cargo cost of 
USD 12 per mmBtu and the JKS USD 16 per mmBtu from the previous VCF model, I will now 
choose three different prices in order to see how the ACFs will be affected. For the cargo cost, I 
have chosen the rates 7 USD/mmBtu, 10 USD/mmBtu and 13 USD/mmBtu. For the JKS sales 
price, I have chosen 11 USD/mmBtu, 14 USD/mmBtu and 16 USD/mmBtu. 
2.4.3 The Annual Cash Flow results 
 
I have computed the ACFs results from the Excel sheet in Table 20 and Table 21 for each LNG 
carrier. The numbers are calculated from the cash flows generated over a year divided by the net 
annual volumes sold in mmBtu. The sensitivity analysis is performed by varying the TC charter 
rate, the cargo price and the selling JKS price. The reference “130,000/10/16” for instance 
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corresponds to the “TC rate/cargo cost/JKS price”. I have also studied the cases where I take into 
account the broker’s commission or not.  
 
ST Polar Bear ACF 
Without Broker's 
Commission 
Commission 0,20 
USD/mmBtu 
Commission 0,50 
USD/mmBtu 
Route Suez NSR Suez NSR Suez NSR 
NSR Navigable days N.A 90 120 150 N.A 90 120 150 N.A 90 120 150 
100,000/7/11 0,46 0,99 1,13 1,26 0,26 0,79 0,93 1,06 -0,04 0,49 0,63 0,76 
100,000/7/14 3,46 3,99 4,13 4,26 3,26 3,79 3,93 4,06 2,96 3,49 3,63 3,76 
100,000/7/16 5,46 5,99 6,13 6,26 5,26 5,79 5,93 6,06 4,96 5,49 5,63 5,76 
130,000/7/11 -0,17 0,44 0,61 0,76 -0,37 0,24 0,41 0,56 -0,67 -0,06 0,11 0,26 
130,000/7/14 2,83 3,44 3,61 3,76 2,63 3,24 3,41 3,56 2,33 2,94 3,11 3,26 
130,000/7/16 4,83 5,44 5,61 5,76 4,63 5,24 5,41 5,56 4,33 4,94 5,11 5,26 
160,000/7/11 -0,81 -0,10 0,09 0,27 -1,01 -0,30 -0,11 0,07 -1,31 -0,60 -0,41 -0,23 
160,000/7/14 2,19 2,90 3,09 3,27 1,99 2,70 2,89 3,07 1,69 2,40 2,59 2,77 
160,000/7/16 4,19 4,90 5,09 5,27 3,99 4,70 4,89 5,07 3,69 4,40 4,59 4,77 
             
100,000/10/11 -2,94 -2,34 -2,17 -2,03 -3,14 -2,54 -2,37 -2,23 -3,44 -2,84 -2,67 -2,53 
100,000/10/14 0,06 0,66 0,82 0,97 -0,14 0,46 0,62 0,77 -0,44 0,16 0,32 0,47 
100,000/10/16 2,06 2,66 2,82 2,97 1,86 2,46 2,62 2,77 1,56 2,16 2,32 2,47 
130,000/10/11 -3,58 -2,88 -2,69 -2,52 -3,78 -3,08 -2,89 -2,72 -4,08 -3,38 -3,19 -3,02 
130,000/10/14 -0,58 0,12 0,31 0,48 -0,78 -0,08 0,11 0,28 -1,08 -0,38 -0,19 -0,02 
130,000/10/16 1,42 2,12 2,31 2,48 1,22 1,92 2,11 2,28 0,92 1,62 1,81 1,98 
160,000/10/11 -4,22 -3,42 -3,21 -3,01 -4,42 -3,62 -3,41 -3,21 -4,72 -3,92 -3,71 -3,51 
160,000/10/14 -1,22 -0,42 -0,21 -0,01 -1,42 -0,62 -0,41 -0,21 -1,72 -0,92 -0,71 -0,51 
160,000/10/16 0,78 1,58 1,79 1,99 0,58 1,38 1,59 1,79 0,28 1,08 1,29 1,49 
             
100,000/13/14 -3,34 -2,66 -2,48 -2,31 -3,54 -2,86 -2,68 -2,51 -3,84 -3,16 -2,98 -2,81 
100,000/13/16 -1,34 -0,66 -0,48 -0,31 -1,54 -0,86 -0,68 -0,51 -1,84 -1,16 -0,98 -0,81 
 
Table 20: Polar Bear sensitivity analysis of the ACF in USD/mmBtu 
Not surprising, the TFDE Northern Light will always be more profitable to charter for the trader 
than the Polar Bear, although he has to bear higher charter rates. In Table 20, for a given charter 
rate of 100,000 USD/day and a cargo price of 13 USD/mmBtu, if the JKS sales price is 14 
USD/mmBtu or 16 USD/mmBtu, it will never be profitable for the charterer to trade with the 
Polar Bear. For the Northern Light in Table 21 however, it is interesting to observe that at a JKS 
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price of 16 USD/mmBtu, given charter rate of 100,000 USD/day and a cargo price of 13 
USD/mmBtu, the trader will be able to generate a positive ACF. For instance, if we ignore the 
broker’s commission, it will be profitable to sail via the NSR but not through the Suez Canal with 
the Northern Light. Because of economies of scale, the trader of the Northern light can bear 
higher cargo cost than the trader of the Polar Bear. 
When moving from left to the right in the columns, we can notice that the results are sensitive to 
the broker’s commission. Many numbers drop from a net profit to a net loss (in fat) when 
increasing the commission rate from zero to 0.20 USD/mmBtu or 0.50 USD/mmBtu. 
TFDE Northern 
Light ACF 
Without Broker's 
Commission 
Commission  
0,20 USD/mmBtu 
Commission  
0,50 USD/mmBtu 
Route Suez NSR Suez NSR Suez NSR 
NSR Navigable days N.A 90 120 150 N.A 90 120 150 N.A 90 120 150 
120,000/7/11 1,09 1,48 1,58 1,68 0,89 1,28 1,38 1,48 0,59 0,98 1,08 1,18 
120,000/7/14 4,09 4,48 4,58 4,68 3,89 4,28 4,38 4,48 3,59 3,98 4,08 4,18 
120,000/7/16 6,09 6,48 6,58 6,68 5,89 6,28 6,38 6,48 5,59 5,98 6,08 6,18 
150,000/7/11 0,60 1,05 1,18 1,29 0,40 0,85 0,98 1,09 0,10 0,55 0,68 0,79 
150,000/7/14 3,60 4,05 4,18 4,29 3,40 3,85 3,98 4,09 3,10 3,55 3,68 3,79 
150,000/7/16 5,60 6,05 6,18 6,29 5,40 5,85 5,98 6,09 5,10 5,55 5,68 5,79 
180,000/7/11 0,10 0,62 0,77 0,90 -0,10 0,42 0,57 0,70 -0,40 0,12 0,27 0,40 
180,000/7/14 3,10 3,62 3,77 3,90 2,90 3,42 3,57 3,70 2,60 3,12 3,27 3,40 
180,000/7/16 5,10 5,62 5,77 5,90 4,90 5,42 5,57 5,70 4,60 5,12 5,27 5,40 
             
120,000/10/11 -2,16 -1,72 -1,61 -1,50 -2,36 -1,92 -1,81 -1,70 -2,66 -2,22 -2,11 -2,00 
120,000/10/14 0,84 1,28 1,39 1,50 0,64 1,08 1,19 1,30 0,34 0,78 0,89 1,00 
120,000/10/16 2,84 3,28 3,39 3,50 2,64 3,08 3,19 3,30 2,34 2,78 2,89 3,00 
150,000/10/11 -2,65 -2,15 -2,01 -1,89 -2,85 -2,35 -2,21 -2,09 -3,15 -2,65 -2,51 -2,39 
150,000/10/14 0,35 0,85 0,99 1,11 0,15 0,65 0,79 0,91 -0,15 0,35 0,49 0,61 
150,000/10/16 2,35 2,85 2,99 3,11 2,15 2,65 2,79 2,91 1,85 2,35 2,49 2,61 
180,000/10/11 -3,15 -2,58 -2,42 -2,28 -3,35 -2,78 -2,62 -2,48 -3,65 -3,08 -2,92 -2,78 
180,000/10/14 -0,15 0,42 0,58 0,72 -0,35 0,22 0,38 0,52 -0,65 -0,08 0,08 0,22 
180,000/10/16 1,85 2,42 2,58 2,72 1,65 2,22 2,38 2,52 1,35 1,92 2,08 2,22 
             
120,000/13/14 -2,41 -1,93 -1,80 -1,68 -2,61 -2,13 -2,00 -1,88 -2,91 -2,43 -2,30 -2,18 
120,000/13/16 -0,41 0,07 0,20 0,32 -0,61 -0,13 0,00 0,12 -0,91 -0,43 -0,30 -0,18 
 
Table 21: Northern Light sensitivity analysis of the ACF in USD/mmBtu 
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2.5 Preliminary conclusion on the economical viability 
 
This part had two main purposes. The first one was to investigate the economic attractiveness of 
the NSR compared to the Suez Canal route for a LNG trader. The second purpose was to analyze 
the economic attractiveness of operating a TFDE LNG vessel rather than a ST LNG carrier. A 
case study with the Polar Bear and the Northern Light was carried out where I compared in a 
first part the VCFs for a round trip Hammerfest-Yokohama-Hammerfest and in a second part the 
ACFs generated by a routine service Hammerfest-Yokohama-Hammerfest via the Suez Canal all 
year long and a routine service via the NSR during summer and Suez for the rest of the year. I 
performed some sensitivities by varying key parameters such as the cargo cost, the JKS sales 
price, the sailing speed or the freight rates. These variables were found out to have a significant 
impact on the VCF and ACF results when varying them. 
I can hereby say that the NSR has an economic potential as an alternative route to the Suez Canal. 
LNG traders operating in northern Norway and Russia should see this route as a new and unique 
opportunity for exporting their gas to Asia during summer. For the 2013 season, Rosatomflot, in 
collaboration with the NSRA in Moscow, has reviewed its icebreaking tariffs. According to Ulf 
Hagen (2013), the managing director of Tschudi Arctic Transit, the new tariffs valid from this 
year (unofficial) should be 4.50 USD/GRT laden and 3.50 USD/GRT in ballast for LNG carriers 
exclusively. We have always to keep in mind that Russia wishes to attract new shipments on the 
NSR and increase their competitive position with the Egypt and the Suez Canal. These new 
tariffs should be subject for negotiation between the icebreaking company and the ship owner. 
They should therefore be seen as a maximum tariff rate. 
We have seen from the Ice Class newbuildings list in Table 3 (p39) that ship owners wish LNG 
tankers of higher capacity and at the same time bunker efficient vessels. The majority of the 
traders report that reduced fuel consumption and lowering consumption rates are the key 
priorities (Hine, 2013e). A TFDE LNG carrier, according to our model, should therefore be more 
interesting to opt for rather than a ST vessel. 
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III) Developing a LNG trading project  
3.1 The objective 
 
In this third and last part, I will make an annual voyage plan that a LNG trader could have 
typically chosen in 2012. As we will see, the voyage plan takes into account a way the NSR can 
be used during summer time in order to reach Asia-Pacific. This part is useful and important 
because a trader is unlikely to have a routine service Hammerfest-Yokohama-Hammerfest all 
year long, as we analyzed in part II. He will rather use the NSR as an opportunity whenever the 
conditions and time allow it. I will content this time myself with using only one LNG carrier, the 
Polar Bear. The simple reason is that similar vessels exist in the LNG shipping market and hence 
the data used will be more accurate. As before, to deal will flexibility, a sensitivity analysis will 
be carried out.  
Based on the ACFs the trader of the Polar Bear will generate from his voyage plan, the second 
objective will be to analyze the present value of the project if the voyage plan is maintained and 
repeated over a 15-year period. Estimations of future gas prices, interest rates and inflation rates 
will be necessary in order to evaluate these future cash flows. 
With the intention to “open” my dissertation, I have dedicated a last and third subpart in this 
section to the valuation of an extension option on the 15-year TC contract. As we will see later 
on, it is common for charterers in the LNG industry to enter long term TC contracts with ship 
owners, where they have the possibility to extend the TC contract by five more years. 
3.2 Computing the cash flows 
3.2.1 Description of the voyage plan 
 3.2.1.a)  The sea routes 
 
The 2012 voyage plan will have multi-leg-voyages starting and ending in Hammerfest. Each leg-
voyage will be either performed laden or in ballast. The sales of LNG will be on a Free On Board 
(FOB) basis where per definition the LNG sellers deliver the goods on board and clear the goods 
for export. The buyer bears all costs and risks of loss or damage (Web Courier, 2013). Some 
traders will have to pay for the re-gasification process of their LNG when arriving at the import 
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terminal. I will assume that this cost is not bared by our trader. The scheduled 2012 voyage plan 
is represented in Table 23 (p74). 
As in part two, I assume the average speed to be 18 knots on open blue water routes and 15 knots 
on average between Hammerfest and Asia-Pacific via the NSR. It is implicitly assumed that the 
speed on the route on section K-B of the NSR is maintained as before to 12 knots. These speeds 
will be assumed equal for laden and in ballast voyages. However as before, the LNG bunker rate 
will differ according to Table 22. These numbers are taken from Table 6 in section 2.3.1. 
Routes Blue water Routes via NSR 
Average Speed (knots) 18 15 
Ballast BOG (m
3
/day) 270 210 
Laden BOG (m
3
/day) 300 240 
 
Table 22: Corresponding BOG rates with speeds for laden and in ballast 
I suppose that the 2012 voyage plan starts the 1
st
 January 2012 and ends the 31
st 
December 2012. 
With 365 navigable days a year, the Polar Bear will be able to finalize its voyages in time, given 
that the average speeds and the number of days at port are respected. One day for waiting and 
transit time through the Suez Canal is considered, as before. 
It is not always easy to estimate port days precisely, but I will suppose that these port days take 
into account loading and discharging, documentation, waiting time for a berth and the transiting 
time via the Suez Canal (Stopford, 2009, pp.254). All laden trips will be assumed fully laden with 
146,791 m
3
 LNG on board and the BOG rate will be valued at the JKS gas sales price. The cargo 
loading ports for the Polar Bear are Hammerfest and Bonny Island in Nigeria. The other ports are 
discharging ports with re-gasification facilities which are Yokohama, Huelva, Fos-Cavaou and 
InChon. The numbers of days at port this time are assumed to be 3 days at loading ports and 2 
days at discharging ports. This gives a total annual number of 47 days at port. 
The first two routes between Hammerfest and Yokohama and the first route Hammerfest – 
InChon (marked in red in Table 23) go via the Suez Canal since it is still too early in the year to 
sail via the NSR according to the calendar year.  However, as we can see in the table, the 
subsequent two routes between Norway and Japan/Korea will be performed via the NSR. 
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3.2.1.b)  The voyage costs 
 
Port dues are based on data provided from TEPN for the Arctic Lady and are assumed to be the 
same for the Polar Bear, as we did in part II. It is worth to mention that I have assumed the total 
port costs for Fos-Cavaou and Yokohama to be the same as for Fos-Sur-Mer and Futtsu. The 
costs can be found in Appendix B. 
The exchange rates chosen to convert NOK and Euros into USD are respectively 5,79 NOK/USD 
and 0,77 Euro/USD.  
Route 
Country 
of 
Departure 
Arrival 
Country 
Nature of route 
Distance 
(nm) 
Ballast/ 
Laden 
# of 
days 
# of 
port 
days 
Hammerfest - Yokohama Norway Japan Suez Blue Water 12,500 Laden 29.94 2 
Yokohama - Bonny Japan Nigeria Blue Water 10,626 Ballast 24.60 3 
Bonny - Huelva Nigeria Spain Blue Water 3,359 Laden 7.78 2 
Huelva - Hammerfest Spain Norway Blue Water 2,594 Ballast 6.00 3 
Hammerfest - Fos-Cavaou Norway France Blue Water 3,349 Laden 7.75 2 
Fos-Cavaou - Hammerfest France Norway Blue Water 3,349 Ballast 7.75 3 
Hammerfest - InChon Norway Korea Suez Blue Water 12,214 Laden 29.27 2 
InChon - Bonny Korea Nigeria Blue Water 10,390 Ballast 24.05 3 
Bonny - Yokohama Nigeria Japan Blue Water 10,626 Laden 24.60 2 
Yokohama - Hammerfest Japan Norway Suez Blue Water 12,500 Ballast 29.94 3 
Hammerfest - Yokohama Norway Japan NSR 6,400 Laden 17.78 2 
Yokohama - Bonny Japan Nigeria Blue Water 10,626 Ballast 24.60 3 
Bonny - Huelva Nigeria Spain Blue Water 3,359 Laden 7.78 2 
Huelva - Hammerfest Spain Norway Blue Water 2,594 Ballast 6.00 3 
Hammerfest - Fos-Cavaou Norway France Blue Water 3,349 Laden 7.75 2 
Fos-Cavaou - Hammerfest France Norway Blue Water 3,349 Ballast 7.75 3 
Hammerfest - InChon Norway Korea NSR 6,500 Laden 18.06 2 
InChon - Bonny Korea Nigeria Blue Water 10,390 Ballast 24.05 3 
Bonny - Hammerfest Nigeria Norway Blue Water 6,100 Laden 14.12 2 
   
 
 
Sum 320 47 
   
 
 
Sum days ~365 
Table 23: The 2012 voyage plan 
Source for distances: (Robin & Demoury, 2012) 
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The trader’s insurance costs for the Polar Bear are the same as in Table 10 (p55). The Bonny 
loading insurance costs the trader USD 20,000 for the 2 days loading. The NSR tariff laden is 
USD 355,848 as before. The tariff in ballast of USD 222,500 can be disregarded as the tanker 
will never transit the NSR in ballast according to the voyage plan. The Suez Canal transit costs 
(laden and in ballast) are based on the Arctic Lady’s values from Appendix B. The commercial 
agency cost is assumed USD 30,000 for each NSR transit. The extra communication equipment 
for the NSR and the cost for two sets of Russian charts are ignored. The ice pilotage is supposed 
constant at USD 11,250. Cost for anti-fouling afloat of USD 15,000 is valid for each NSR transit. 
Summing up the voyage costs for each leg-voyage: 
 
                                                                                    
 
 3.2.1.c)  The charter rates 
 
The 2012 voyage plan will be analyzed on a spot charter and on a 1-year TC.  
The 1-year TC rate of 140,000 USD/day is from the date of signature of the contract, the 1
st
 
January 2012, and it is based on the “Assessed Term & Spot Rates” overview for a conventional 
Dual-Fuel Diesel-Electric (DFDE) LNG carrier (Clarksons, 2013).  
I have taken the average spot charter rates corresponding to the period of time each leg-voyage 
takes place. The spot rates are based from a conventional 138,000-150,000 m
3
 Steam Turbine 
LNG carrier (Bakkelund, 2013). The 2012 charter rates are figured in Figure 23.  
Since the Polar Bear is not an ordinary vessel and a clear defined freight market for LNG Ice 
Class carriers doesn’t exist, I am going to assume that these freight rates are also valid for the 
Polar Bear. 
 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 76 - 
 
 
Figure 23: Overview of 2012 charter rates for each leg-voyage (USD/day)  
Source: (Clarksons, 2013) & (Bakkelund, 2013) 
3.2.1.d)  Gas prices 
 
The gas sales prices in Huelva, Fos-Cavaou, Yokohama, and InChon (and Hammerfest for the 
last leg-voyage) are based on real historical NBP and JKS prices from 2012. The rates are the 
same used to study the correlations in part I (p18-19).  
I have contented myself with monthly rates for the gas price estimates having no access to daily 
rates. As an example, if the Polar Bear arrives at the discharging port of Huelva the 23
rd
 March 
2012, I choose the March 2012 NBP price as reference.  
For the JKS price, I have also used monthly numbers; however, the numbers correspond to the 
end of the month prices, the 30
th
 or the 31
st
 day of the month for instance. I will use them as an 
average monthly reference. However, should the vessel arrive in InChon in the middle of April, I 
choose an average of the end of March and the end of April as reference and not the end of April 
price. 
 
Since the trader does not have an ownership on the gas extracted from Hammerfest and Bonny, 
he will have to buy it at the market price and usually pay a premium to the operator of the LNG 
terminal. That is exactly what Gazprom did at Melkøya in November 2012.  
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The gas prices in Bonny will be assumed 11 USD/mmBtu, 9 USD/mmBtu or 8 USD/mmBtu 
depending on the sales price at the import country (ref Table 24 and 25).  
For the gas bought in Hammerfest and sold to Japan and Korea at the JKS, the cost will be the 
monthly NBP price and I will add the premium of 2 USD/mmBtu as I did in part II.  
LNG cargos to France (Fos-Cavaou) in provenance from Hammerfest are sold at the NBP price. 
Exceptionally for this particular route, the trader and the LNG seller in Hammerfest have agreed 
on a fair cargo price of 8 USD/mmBtu for the first voyage and 9 USD/mmBtu for the second one.  
As before, LNG is used as bunker, hence the BOG cost for our trader is based on the market price 
(NBP or JKS). Since every laden voyage is followed by a voyage in ballast, the BOG cost during 
the voyage in ballast is taken into account in the laden voyage. Hence, the net LNG volume sold 
when the Polar Bear arrives at the import port is the cargo volume (146,791 m
3
) minus the 
bunker consumption volume for the laden voyage and for the following voyage in ballast. When 
the Polar Bear is doing the voyage via the NSR, extra bunker consumption for winterization is 
considered. Extra bunker consumption in waters with summer sea-ice is negligible.  
3.2.2 Finding the results 
3.2.2.a)  Voyage and Annual Cash Flows results 
 
In the following tables, we will find the overview of the trader’s ACFs resulting from his 2012 
voyage plan. Table 24 illustrates the case where the Polar Bear has been chartered in the spot 
market for a year and the second one, Table 25, illustrates the 1-year TC case. 
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Table 24 (left) and Table 25 (right): Trader’s ACF analysis in a spot charter (left) and in a 1-year TC (right) 
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3.2.2.b)  Comments and implications 
 
The ACFs are calculated before tax and I do not take into account the broker’s commission. The 
total net LNG volumes sold during 2012 was 31,886,921 mmBtu or 1,374,436 m
3
. Under a spot 
charter, the results give the trader an ACF of USD 2,804,545 or 0.088 USD/mmBtu. For the 1-
year TC voyage, the trader has a loss of USD 1,392,057 or 0.044 USD/mmBtu. The 2012 voyage 
plan in the spot charter market would have given the trader an incremental profit of 0.132 
USD/mmBtu compared to the 1-year TC voyage.  
It is worth to notice that the trader would have earned money in almost all the laden leg-voyages, 
excepted the last leg Hammerfest-InChon via the NSR where he would have generated a loss of 
USD 581,229 under spot and a loss of USD 1,162,840 under a 1-year TC. The main reason is that 
the margin between the LNG he buys at 12.32 USD/mmBtu and the price he sells it for (14.10 
USD/mmBtu) is too small to generate a surplus on this route given the exposure costs. The two 
voyages via the NSR in 2012 saves the charterer valuable time and has probably enabled him to 
make an extra voyage or two in 2012 than if he had taken the Suez Canal. 
3.2.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 3.2.3.a)  Varying the hire rate 
 
If there were few Ice Class 1A LNG carriers available for a 1-year spot charter the 1
st
 January 
2012, the ship owner would have probably required a higher freight rate. Let’s suppose he 
required an additional 10% on the 2012 spot market rates, if that was the case, the trader would 
have generated a loss of 0,060 USD/mmBtu. 
If the trader had paid 10% less than the 2012 spot market rates, due to plenty of Ice Class 1A 
LNG carriers available in the market for instance, the trader would have generated a surplus of 
0.236 USD/mmBtu. 
In Table 26 I have listed the ACFs expressed in USD/mmBtu by varying the 1-year TC rate from 
80,000 USD/day to 195,000 USD/day. Giving that all the other parameters are hold constant, we 
notice that the trader of the Polar Bear would have reached the break even for a 1-year TC rate 
between 135,000 USD/day and 140,000 USD/day. 
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1-Yr TC rate Jan 2012 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000 105,000 110,000 115,000 
ACF (USD/mmBtu) 0,646 0,589 0,531 0,474 0,416 0,359 0,301 0,244 
1-Yr TC rate Jan 2012 120,000 125,000 130,000 135,000 140 000 145,000 150,000 155,000 
ACF (USD/mmBtu) 0,186 0,129 0,071 0,014 -0,044 -0,101 -0,159 -0,216 
1-Yr TC rate Jan 2012 160,000 165,000 170,000 175,000 180,000 185,000 190,000 195,000 
ACF (USD/mmBtu) -0,274 -0,331 -0,389 -0,446 -0,503 -0,561 -0,618 -0,676 
 
Table 26: ACFs sensitivities by varying the 1-year TC rate 
3.2.3.b)  Varying the sailing speed 
 
Holding all parameters constant, if we vary the sailing speed it is interesting to study how the 
cash flows will be affected. Table 27 and 28 give us an overview of the ACFs for a range of 
different speeds. I have delimited with a fat line the positive numbers from the negative ones. It is 
important to mention that we do not take into consideration the Natural Boil of Gas (NBOG) of 
192 m
3
 (Lauritzen, 2013). Typically for low speeds, when the BOG rate is lower than the NBOG, 
the vessel is consuming less than the NBOG level which leads to a net loss of LNG volumes 
during transport, especially when low speed is maintained over long periods. The Polar Bear 
should therefore rather keep an average speed higher than 14 knots in ballast and 12.5 knots laden 
(ref Table 6 p48). 
Under a spot charter in Table 27, we can observe that there is room for the trader to increase his 
ACF slightly by increasing its sailing speed on routes via the NSR. An average sailing speed of 
16.5 knots on routes via the NSR keeping the average speed on normal routes the same at 18 
knots would have increased his ACF from 0.088 USD/mmBtu to 0.099 USD/mmBtu, a slight 
increase though. 
Under a 1-year TC in Table 28, we notice that it wouldn’t have helped to increase the Polar 
Bear’s sailing speed in order to generate a positive ACF, neither on normal routes or on routes 
via the NSR. The table shows only negative values of ACFs. 
In Figure 24 and Figure 25 bellow I have figured from Table 27 and 28 the ACFs as function of 
speed on normal routes (blue water) for different speed level ranges on routes via the NSR. We 
notice again from the curves the maximum point achieved at a sailing speed of 18 knots on 
normal routes. 
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Table 27 (upper) and Table 28 (under): ACF sensitivities by varying the sailing speeds 
 
 
Figure 24: ACFs as function of average sailing speed on normal routes in a spot charter 
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16,5 17 17,5 18 18,5 19
8 -1,308 -0,743 -0,597 -0,474 -0,369 -0,280 -0,202 -0,134 -0,103 -0,074 -0,046 -0,020 -0,052 -0,082
10 -1,258 -0,694 -0,547 -0,424 -0,320 -0,230 -0,152 -0,084 -0,053 -0,024 0,004 0,030 -0,002 -0,032
11 -1,243 -0,678 -0,531 -0,408 -0,304 -0,214 -0,136 -0,068 -0,037 -0,008 0,020 0,046 0,014 -0,016
12 -1,230 -0,665 -0,518 -0,395 -0,291 -0,201 -0,123 -0,055 -0,024 0,005 0,033 0,059 0,028 -0,002
13 -1,219 -0,655 -0,507 -0,384 -0,280 -0,190 -0,112 -0,044 -0,013 0,016 0,044 0,070 0,039 0,009
14 -1,210 -0,645 -0,498 -0,375 -0,270 -0,181 -0,103 -0,034 -0,003 0,026 0,054 0,080 0,048 0,019
15 -1,202 -0,637 -0,490 -0,367 -0,262 -0,172 -0,094 -0,026 0,005 0,034 0,062 0,088 0,057 0,027
16 -1,194 -0,630 -0,483 -0,359 -0,255 -0,165 -0,087 -0,019 0,012 0,042 0,069 0,095 0,064 0,034
16,5 -1,191 -0,627 -0,479 -0,356 -0,252 -0,162 -0,084 -0,016 0,016 0,045 0,072 0,099 0,067 0,038
17 -1,188 -0,624 -0,476 -0,353 -0,249 -0,159 -0,081 -0,012 0,019 0,048 0,076 0,102 0,071 0,041
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16,5 17 17,5 18 18,5 19
8 -1,568 -0,962 -0,801 -0,667 -0,552 -0,454 -0,369 -0,294 -0,260 -0,228 -0,198 -0,169 -0,199 -0,227
10 -1,511 -0,906 -0,744 -0,609 -0,495 -0,397 -0,311 -0,236 -0,202 -0,170 -0,140 -0,112 -0,141 -0,169
11 -1,493 -0,888 -0,726 -0,591 -0,477 -0,378 -0,293 -0,218 -0,184 -0,152 -0,122 -0,093 -0,122 -0,151
12 -1,478 -0,872 -0,711 -0,576 -0,461 -0,363 -0,278 -0,203 -0,169 -0,136 -0,106 -0,078 -0,107 -0,135
13 -1,466 -0,860 -0,698 -0,563 -0,449 -0,350 -0,265 -0,190 -0,156 -0,123 -0,093 -0,065 -0,094 -0,122
14 -1,455 -0,849 -0,687 -0,552 -0,437 -0,339 -0,253 -0,178 -0,144 -0,112 -0,082 -0,053 -0,083 -0,111
15 -1,445 -0,839 -0,678 -0,543 -0,428 -0,329 -0,244 -0,169 -0,135 -0,103 -0,072 -0,044 -0,073 -0,101
16 -1,437 -0,831 -0,669 -0,534 -0,419 -0,321 -0,235 -0,160 -0,126 -0,094 -0,064 -0,035 -0,064 -0,092
16,5 -1,433 -0,827 -0,666 -0,530 -0,416 -0,317 -0,231 -0,156 -0,122 -0,090 -0,060 -0,031 -0,061 -0,088
17,0 -1,430 -0,824 -0,662 -0,527 -0,412 -0,313 -0,228 -0,153 -0,119 -0,087 -0,056 -0,028 -0,057 -0,085
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Average 
speed on 
routes via 
NSR (knots)
Spot charter 
1 year TC rate 140,000 
USD/day
Average 
speed on 
routes via 
NSR (knots)
Average speed on normal routes (knots)
-1,4 
-1,2 
-1,0 
-0,8 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-0,2 
0,0 
0,2 
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16,5 17 17,5 18 18,5 19 
A
C
F 
(U
SD
/m
m
B
tu
) 
Average speed on normal routes (knots) 
NSR 11 knots NSR 13 knots 
NSR 15 knots NSR 16 knots 
NSR 17 knots 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 82 - 
 
 
Figure 25: ACFs as function of average sailing speed on normal routes in a 1-year TC charter 
 
Remember that “NSR 15 knots” doesn’t refer to the average speed on the NSR from the Kara 
Strait to the Bering Strait. This time, the speed refers to the average speed from Hammerfest to 
Japan or Korea via the NSR. 
The maximums on both figures are reached at a speed of 18 knots on normal (blue water) routes. 
At this level, supposing that the average speed on routes via the NSR is 16 knots in the spot 
charter market, the trader would have reached a maximum of 0.095 USD/mmBtu according to 
tables and figures. In the TC market, the maximum reached would have been a loss of 0.035 
USD/mmBtu. The curves are concave meaning that we have a decreasing but positive marginal 
ACF up to the maximum at 18 knots. From 18 knots and onwards, the marginal ACF is negative. 
3.2.3.c)  Varying the gas prices 
 
What happens this time with the results when we vary the gas prices by a delta (Δ) factor, 
supposing that all other parameters are hold constant? In Table 29 and Table 30, I have figured in 
red the results from Table 24 and Table 25 (p78) with the 2012 gas prices. I have varied the gas 
sales price and the cargo cost from -40% to +40%. I have delimited in the tables the positive 
results from the negative ones with a fat line. 
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Table 29 (left) and Table 30 (right): ACFs sensitivities by varying the gas prices 
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The ACF of 0.088 USD/mmBtu we found for the spot charter case (marked in red) is positive. 
However, we can observe that the number is not far away from the negative zone in the table. A 
slight increase of 5% in the cargo cost, given the same sales prices, would have generated the 
LNG trader a loss 0.350 USD/mmBtu in 2012. Given a total of 31,866,921 mmBtu LNG sold in 
2012, this would represent a loss of USD 11,153,422 for the trader; a considerable amount. On 
the other way round, if the sales prices had increased by 5% given constant costs, the trader 
would have generated a profit of 0.618 USD/mmBtu or 19,693,757 USD in total, before tax 
though. 
Under the 1-year TC hire, we know that the trader makes a slight loss of 0.044 USD/mmBtu. 
According to Table 30, a decrease of 5% in the cargo costs or an increase of 5% of the sales 
prices would have been enough for the trader to switch from a loss to a profit. 
What can be said is that the trader’s cash flows are sensitive to changes of the gas prices. Small 
variations in gas prices have large variation effects on the ACFs. Traders should be aware of that. 
A 5% increase or decrease in prices seems not so much in fact, but it is enough to make a big 
difference for the trader. 
3.3 A Net Present Value Analysis 
3.3.1 Setting the limits 
 
I will assume that the trader’s 2012 voyage plan is maintained and repeated every year from 2012 
until the beginning of 2027. Since it is a long term contract, the 15-year TC rate paid by the trader 
(charterer) to the ship owner depends this time on the delivered newbuilding price of the vessel, 
on its lifetime and on the required rate of return (cost of capital) to the ship owner. The new 
building price for a conventional 150,000 m
3
 LNG carrier at the beginning of 2012 was at USD 
205 million. By adding 5%, we get a delivered newbuilding cost of USD 215 million. Assuming 
a required rate of return of 8% to the ship owner and a lifetime of 25 years for the vessel, the 
daily CAPEX paid by the trader to the ship owner during 15 years is USD 55,181 per day 
(Bakkelund, 2013). This number can be found from the following annuity formula. 
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Assuming 365 days of operation per year 
                    
In addition, as the Polar Bear is Ice Class 1A, the trader chartering this vessel has to pay usually 
the ship owner a premium of 2,567 USD/day. This number is based on an incremental delivered 
newbuilding cost of USD 10 million for an Ice Class 1A and an 8% required rate of return for the 
ship owner over 25 years (Bakkelund, 2013). Generally, for long term contracts lasting 15 years, 
the ship owner would charge the charterer a fix daily OPEX rate. If we assume an OPEX of 
20,000 USD/day (Bakkelund, 2013), this gives us a total daily 15-year TC rate of        
                             
All information in terms of distances, destinations, speed, cargo volumes will be held as before. 
The only variables that will differ from year to year will be the market gas prices. 
3.3.2 Forecasting the data 
 3.3.2.a)  The gas prices  
 
The gas prices for 2012 will be held the same as before. The average annual gas prices forecast 
for 2013 until 2026 included are based on expectations from Wood Mackenzie (2013). Sales to 
France receive a price in nominal terms of 12.68 USD/mmBtu in 2013, 11.88 USD/mmBtu in 
2014, 11.41 USD/mmBtu in 2015 and 10.97 USD/mmBtu in 2016 remaining flat thereafter. 
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Sales to Spain will receive a price in nominal terms of 10.82 USD/mmBtu in 2013, 10.15 
USD/mmBtu in 2014, 9.76 USD/mmBtu in 2015 and 9.39 USD/mmBtu in 2016 remaining flat 
thereafter. 
I assume that sales prices in nominal terms to Hammerfest (last leg-voyage from Bonny to 
Hammerfest) are the average of the French and Spanish prices. 
Sales prices to Korea and Japan will be assumed 1 USD/mmBtu higher than the Malaysian 
prices, the only reference I have access to from Wood Mackenzie. The simple reason behind this 
is that Japan demands high volumes of LNG. Thus, sales will receive a price, 14.90 USD/mmBtu 
in 2013, 13.81 USD/mmBtu in 2014, 13.15 USD/mmBtu in 2015 and 12.52 USD/mmBtu in 2016 
remaining flat thereafter. 
The cost for the LNG cargo in Hammerfest and Bonny will be based on the NBP spot. I will 
assume this cost to be 9.50 USD/mmBtu in 2013. The year to year change in the price will be 
based on the percentage change of the year to year change of the sales price in France. 
Consequently, the price will be 8.90 USD/mmBtu in 2014, 8.55 USD/mmBtu in 2015 and 8.22 
USD/mmBtu in 2016 remaining flat thereafter. The following graph gives a summary of the 
estimated pricing schemes from 2013 to 2026 just mentioned. 
 
Figure 26: Forecasted gas prices for 2013 until 2026  
Source: (Wood Mackenzie, 2013) 
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3.3.2.b)  General economic assumptions 
 
The 15-year TC rate is a function of the ship owner’s cost of capital. Assuming a required rate of 
return to the ship owner of 6%, 7%, 8%, 9% or 10%, I have come to the following results for the 
15-year TC rate paid by the trader. 
Required rate of return to ship owner  6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
CAPEX (USD/day) 46,078 50,546 55,181 59,968 64,894 
CAPEX Premium for Ice Class 1A (USD/day) 2,143 2,351 2,567 2,789 3,018 
OPEX (USD/day) 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
15-year TC rate (USD/day) 68,221 72,897 77,748 82,757 87,912 
 
Table 31: Effect of the required rate of return to the ship owner on the 15-year TC rate paid by the trader 
 3.3.2.c)  The Present Value of the trader’s 15-year  project 
 
With the five 15-year TC rates scenarios in place (Table 31) and the expected gas prices from 
Figure 26, I computed the trader’s Annual Cash Flows (ACFs) for the 15-year project in Excel 
and I calculated the Net Present Value NPV of the project at 1
st
 January 2012 based on the 
Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF). The NPV (Investopedia, 2013) is generally defined
7
 as  
      
    
      
 
   
               
where 
                                 
                                
                                   
                              
In our particular case we will have 
         
    
      
             
  
   
 
                                                          
7
 There is no initial investment cost I0 for the trader since the ship owner invests in the vessel 
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3.3.2.d)  Result of the Net Present Value 
 
 
Figure 27: Trader’s NPV of the 15-year project as function of his required rate of return 
 
I have only represented in the above figure three of the five cases regarding the ship owner’s cost 
of capital. We notice that for low values of the trader’s required rate of return r, the differences in 
NPVs are evident when varying the ship owner’s required rate of return. If r was equal to 6%, the 
trader would have an NPV of USD 466 million, USD 432 million or USD 396 million depending 
on the ship owner’s cost of capital. The higher the value of r, the lower becomes the spreads of 
NPVs as the curves are converging to a same limit. The trader should go into this 15-year project 
according to Figure 27 since the NPVs are positive. 
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3.4 Valuing a five year extension option on the 15-year TC contract 
3.4.1 Real options  
 3.4.1.a)  Definitions 
 
An option is defined as a right but not an obligation to undertake an action at a predetermined 
cost (exercise price) for a predetermined period (option’s lifetime). In finance, there are mainly 
two categories of options: “call options” and “put options”. A call option gives a person the right 
but not the obligation to buy an underlying asset from the option writer (seller) at a 
predetermined price at a certain point in time in the future. A put option gives the option holder 
the right to sell an underlying asset at a predetermined price at a certain point in time in the 
future. The buyer of the option is often said to have a long position. The writer of the option has a 
short position and is obliged to follow the option holder’s decision (Alizadeh & Nikos, 2009).  
A call (put) option is said to be in-the-money when the exercise price is under (above) the price of 
the underlying asset. In the other way round, the option is said to be out-of-money. Whenever the 
exercise price is equal to the price of the underlying asset, the option is said to be at-the-money. 
There are many different types of options; the most common ones are the European option and 
the American option. A European option gives the possibility for the option holder to exercise 
only at maturity date      For an American one, the option holder can decide to exercise at any 
time before maturity date T (Alizadeh & Nikos, 2009). 
Real options refer to options when the underlying asset is a physical asset, also known as tangible 
asset (De Giovanni & Jørgensen, 2009). LNG carriers for instance are regarded as tangible assets. 
Real options capture the value of managerial flexibility to adapt decisions in response to 
unexpected market developments, giving the manager of the option the right to defer, expand, 
contract or abandon a project when more information becomes available (Bendall, 2010). Real 
options in the LNG shipping industry are common. 
 3.4.1.b)  Real options in the LNG shipping industry 
 
Two main parties are involved in the charter market, the charterer (our trader) and the ship 
owner. Whenever a charterer enters a long term TC contract with the ship owner, it is usually 
common in the LNG shipping industry that the charterer enters the contract where he has the 
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option to extend the duration of it. The usual extension period consists of two periods of five 
years, which is the case for the Arctic Lady for instance as we already know. Indeed, TEPN opted 
for a 20-year TC for the Arctic Lady with and option of 5+5 years. This contract was signed with 
Høegh LNG, the ship owner (Laurent, 2013).  
Some charterers can have the option to purchase the vessel at the end of the long term TC. These 
types of options are better known as TC-POPs. Under a European TC-POP, the charterer has the 
opportunity to purchase the vessel at the end of the charter period at a predetermined price 
(Bendall, 2010).  
Real options are important to understand in the LNG shipping industry as they are common for 
long term TC contracts. They may have a substantial value, but they are often given away by the 
ship owner (Strandenes, 2011). In my dissertation, I will only content myself with a value 
analysis of an extension option. 
 3.4.1.c)  Advantages of extending the DCF method  
 
The trader of the Polar Bear entered a 15-year contract with the ship owner the 1
st
 January 2012 
(“today”). Next, I will analyze the value “today” of a 5 year extension option taking place at the 
end of the 15-year TC contract (1
st
 January 2027). The option will be a European call option, 
giving the trader the right but not the obligation to exercise the option only at maturity date T. 
The exercise date T will be two years before the end of the 15-year TC contract. Knowing that 
the 15-year TC contract comes to an end the 1
st
 January 2027, the exercise date takes than place 
the 1
st
 January 2025. 
When analyzing the net present value of a TC project, the most common method used is the DCF 
model. However, it has the weakness to not take into account the managerial flexibility under the 
project’s lifetime and can be regarded as to static. When a charterer enters a long term TC 
contract with a ship owner, the decision to enter the contract can be regarded as a large scale 
capital evaluation problem within the context of a great number of volatile parameters (Bendall, 
2010). Volatile parameters are synonym of risk for the charterer. He will always be glad for 
having some flexibility when entering a contract. An extension option adds such flexibility to the 
charterer. The Real Option Analysis (ROA) is an extension of the DCF adding the value of 
flexibility (Bendall, 2010). The extension option can be of high substantial value for the Polar 
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Bear’s ship owner but are often given away to the charterer as mentioned before. In the case 
where the option is given away to the charterer (trader), the only thing we know is that the value 
of the option by accepting it is not negative for the trader. Whenever the trader wishes to “buy” 
such an option, it will represent an extra exposure cost for him. However, he can benefit from this 
option if the 5-year TC market rate at expiration date turns out to be higher than the agreed option 
rate. In this way he will be protected against rising freight rates in the future. With an extension 
option, he will also be able to generate revenues from LNG trade during five more years. Thus 
                                                                                          
 
where                                                                        
                                                                
 
By value, I refer to the “value today”, the value at the date of signature of the long term TC 
contract the 1
st
 January 2012. 
Figure 28 captures the chronology of the important dates to have in mind. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: The structure of the project including a 5-year extension option 
 
 3.4.1.d)  Methodology 
 
The methodology used in the dissertation to value the 5-year extension option will be the Black-
Scholes-Merton (BSM) model. It is the most common model used for financial options and can 
also be used for real options as we will see next. 
Start of the 15-year TC contract, 
date of written option 
1st January 2012, t=0 
Exercise decision 
1st January 2025, t=13 
End of 15-year 
contract, start of 
extension period 
1st January 2027, t=15 
End of extension 
period 
1st January 2032, t=20 
Initial 15-year TC contract Period of extension option 
t 
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For a dividend paying stock, the value of a European call option at date t according to Hull 
(2012) is given by  
                
                                       
 
where     
   
  
 
       
  
 
      
       
  and               
                                              
                     
                    
                                                
                                                            
                                                  
                                                                          
Some important assumptions behind this BSM formula are to be taken into account. 
- The continuously compounded return on the underlying asset is assumed to be normally 
distributed and independent over time. In our case, the 5-year TC rate will be the underlying asset 
and is assumed to follow a random walk over time leading to a normal return distribution. Thus, 
the TC rate follows a stochastic process over time. 
- The volatility expressed with the standard deviation σ will be based on historical fluctuations 
and will be assumed constant during the five years of the extension. 
- There are no transaction and tax costs. Real options are not traded in the market and have no 
transaction costs.  
- The formula for the call option shows how we can replicate a portfolio by going short in the 
underlying asset and borrowing at the risk free rate. For real options in our case, the replicating 
portfolio and the question of arbitrage opportunities has little sense.       and       correspond 
to probabilities in a risk neutral world; this is important to have in mind for later on. For instance, 
      is the probability that the option will be exercised in a risk-neutral world (Hull, 2012). 
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- A real option does not pay out dividends δ, however the factor exists. For real assets, it is often 
more difficult to estimate this factor than for financial assets since the asset is not openly traded. 
Many real options analysts assume it to be zero or use an arbitrary value and test the option’s 
value sensitivity (Davis, 1998). Over the time, the dividend yield δ is simply the difference 
between the total expected rate of return μ on the underlying asset and the expected growth rate 
or capital gain rate α (Triantis, 2003). 
-The time to expiration T is 13 years if we place ourselves at t=0. The decision to exercise is done 
two years before the end of the 15-year contract. 
 
3.4.2 Valuating the trader’s extension option  
3.4.2.a)  Applying the methodology 
 
When substituting the convenience yield δ with       in the BSM formula and    with 
          , we get 
                   
                                 
where     
   
  
 
       
  
 
  
   
             and         
In our case, we have an uncertainty on the development of the TC rates; hence the value of the 
extension option must be adjusted for this uncertainty. Usually, when developing the BSM 
differential equation, the equation is independent of risk preferences; we are in a risk neutral 
world and the expected return on all investment assets is the risk free rate r (Hull, 2012). The risk 
free interest rate r used will be assumed equal to the yield of a 20-year US treasury bill of 2.50% 
per year. Parameter     refers to the risk adjusted annual growth rate of the underlying asset for a 
thirteen years perspective (time to expiration T). The factor δ is replaced by      . The way we 
calculate     is described later. 
The daily TC rate paid during the 5-year extension period from 1
st
 January 2027 to 1
st
 January 
2032 will be denominated η. The charterer will have an incentive to exercise the extension option 
if and only if η is lower than the equivalent market TC rate at the time of exercise. However, in 
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order to value the 5-year extension option, η is not exactly the exercise price used in the BSM 
model. The exercise price K is the date t=15 present value of the daily η paid between the 
beginning and the end of the five year extension period, discounted back by two years since the 
decision to exercise is done two years previously to the start of the extension period at t=13 (ref 
Figure 28) (Dahr, 2007). Hence, considering 365 days of operation a year, the exercise price 
  
 
      
         
 
 
   
 
       
                
There is no uncertainty regarding the contracted rate η because the rate is settled 1
st
 January 2012 
between both parties; the charterer and the ship owner. Hence the risk free rate r can be used in 
this case.    corresponds to the number of annuities (option’s duration) and is equal to five 
(    ). The last term represents the Present Value of an Annuity (PVA) formula (Bodie, Kan 
& Marcus, 2011). 
Today’s value of the underlying asset    in the BSM formula refers to the present value of the 
daily TC freight rate ɸ observed in the market the 1st January 2012 for an equivalent five year 
period (Dahr, 2007). It is given by 
            
 
      
   
      
  
       
                
Parameter    refers to the risk adjusted annual growth rate of the TC rate ɸ for a five year 
perspective.  Remember that I assumed the TC freight rate ɸ to follow stochastic process. This is 
because the TC rate ɸ observed the 1st January 2012 has an uncertain five year development. 
Thus, the risk free interest rate r must be adjusted for     The last term this time is the Present 
Value of a Growing Annuity (PVGA) formula (Finance Formulas, 2013). 
We know that the BSM formula uses the risk free interest rate r as discounting factor because of 
the risk neutral world. The probabilities used in the BSM model are risk neutral hence the 
uncertain development of the underlying asset is neutralized. 
In our case, we have uncertainty regarding the development of the TC rates and thus the value of 
the extension option must be adjusted for this uncertainty. The TC freight rate can be regarded as 
non-traded asset. How can it be adjusted for systematic risk? The method used is presented in the 
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course of “Principles of Derivatives Pricing and Risk Management” at NHH taught by Haug 
(2012). 
The risk adjusted annual growth rate, also called risk neutral drift, can be defined as 
                        
In our case, we have to differentiate the risk adjusted growth rate      in the BSM formula from 
the growth rate    employed for   .   refers to the drift term or the expected annual growth rate 
in the underlying asset. Since the two calculations refer to different time perspectives, different   
will be used since the expected annual growth rates for a five year perspective is different from a 
thirteen year perspective. Parameter σ represents the standard deviation of the TC rate and is 
assumed constant. The market price per unit of asset risk is denominated by λ, better known as 
Equivalent Martingale Measure restriction or Sharpe ratio here. 
We know that 
                        
For the continuous-time version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
     
  
  
                      
It follows from substituting     with (3.10) that 
    
  
  
                      
Hence the risk adjusted annual growth rate 
          
  
  
                      
The coefficient ρ is the instantaneous correlation between the percentage change in the 
underlying asset and the return on a market index. A typical market index could be the S&P 500, 
which will be the one considered in my case. The expected return and volatility of the S&P 500 
are represented by    and   .  
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3.4.2.b)  Computing the results 
 
The expected annual market rate of return for the S&P 500 is assumed         and the 
volatility       . We have supposed the risk free interest rate to be        which gives a 
market risk premium of 5%. The volatility σ is set to 10%.  
In LNG shipping, the spot charter market went liquid as late as 2005 (Bakkelund, 2013). The 
correlation coefficient between the TC freight rate and the S&P index is based on historical 
values back from February 2008 in Appendix D. The coefficient gives a slight positive value of 
      . The fact that the number is closer to zero than one is not surprising. We expect freight 
rates to be positive correlated to the S&P 500. However freight rates are sensitive to LNG 
shipping specific indicators in addition to general macroeconomic indicators that influence the 
S&P 500’s behavior. These LNG shipping industry specific indicators can be the supply and 
demand conditions in natural gas, the availability of vessels, the overcapacity or under capacity, 
speculative orders and newbuilding prices.  
Now, what are the values of    and     in order to find    and    ?  
Let’s assume that we are the 1st January 2012 (t=0). On a 5-year horizon, we may have expected 
the TC rates to continue rising in 2012 as a consequence of the Fukushima earthquake in Japan in 
2011 and the expected low number of new built vessel deliveries for 2012. After a likely peak in 
the freight rates for 2012, let’s assume the freight rates were predicted to gradually fall to normal 
levels again during 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. An expected annual growth in freight rate of 
       for the five coming years is thus assumed here. 
For the 13-year perspective it is even harder to predict the expected annual growth rate in freight 
rates. The longer the time horizon is, the more difficult it is to forecast the balance between 
supply and demand of tonnage for instance. We can suppose that the American shale gas will 
continue having a positive impact on the US LNG export volumes. We know that the first US 
LNG shipment for export is due to start from Sabine Pass soon. Emerging markets should 
continue to have a growth in their imported LNG volumes. China and India may probably be the 
biggest importers over time. However it is difficult to estimate with certainty an expected annual 
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growth rate over thirteen years. I will thus assume the annual growth in the TC freight rates over 
thirteen years to be zero, thus       . 
Given the above numbers 
      
  
  
             
         
    
                                       
        
  
  
            
         
    
                                       
The daily TC-rate η agreed the 1
st
 January 2012 for the extension period is assumed equal to the 
rate paid in the 15-year contract before exercise, meaning USD 77,748 per day. The TC rate ɸ for 
a five years perspective on 1
st
 January 2012 was around USD 120,000 USD/day. We thus get 
  
 
          
              
 
     
   
 
          
                            
 
                 
 
             
   
          
          
                             
From the BSM formula 
   
   
           
                     
 
      
     
       
                            
                                           
From the cumulative normal distribution function in Excel, we find  
                                        
                                        
We can finally find the value at t=0 of the extension option by computing the numbers in the 
BSM formula. We thus get 
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The option to extend the 15-year TC contract by five more years from the 1
st
 January 2027 has a 
present value of USD 45 million. This number corresponds to the value of flexibility observed 
the 1
st
 January 2012 (t=0), a substantial value that the ship owner should not ignore. 
What is the value of the project without flexibility?  
Recall that the value without flexibility is the value today of the 15-year TC contract. Knowing 
that the trader pays USD 77,748 per day for chartering the Polar Bear during 15 years, we get 
                                              
 
     
   
 
           
              
                                                   
We can use the risk less interest rate r of 2.5% as discounting factor since there is no uncertainty 
regarding the daily TC rate paid by the charterer during the 15 years. 
Thus, the total value today of the project is given by 
                                                                                  
This value of USD 396,705,420 represents the total price a rational trader would have paid for 
chartering the Polar Bear on a 15-year TC with an extension option of five years. 
Some sensitivities can be carried out by varying some key parameters in the BSM model. I have 
chosen three parameters having an important impact on the real option’s value. 
The TC freight rate η 
The daily TC rate η contracted the 1
st
 January 2012 for the extension period of five years appears 
in the option’s strike price K, which is the present value of the stream of η (equation 3.7 at p94). 
The first intuition says that the higher η is, the higher is K, the lower are the chances to end up in-
the-money for the trader and thus the lower is the value of the call option as one can observe in 
Figure 29. The curve is convex meaning that the higher η is, the lower is the fall in value of the 
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extension option. The reason for the convexity lays in the fact that η appears indirectly in the 
probability       that the option will be exercised in a risk-neutral world. The higher η is, the 
lower becomes d2 and thus the lower is        So a higher η decreases in fact the probability for 
exercise explaining why we have this convexity of the curve. 
 
Figure 29: Option’s value as function of parameter η 
 
The annual growth in TC rates     and    
These factors are of highly importance in order to determine the risk adjusted growth rates     
and    calculated before. I took some assumption based on market expectations and are thus to 
some extent uncertain. It is therefore worth to vary them in order to deal with flexibility and see 
how the value of the extension option will be affected. I have represented in Figure 30 the value 
of the extension option as function of the annual growth in TC rates,     in blue and    in red, for 
an interval          . Notice that I let only one of the two variables to vary at the time. Varying 
    keeping    constant at -1% leads to the blue curve. Varying     keeping     constant at 0% 
leads to the red curve. All other parameters are held constant. 
What can be said first of all is that both curves have a positive trend. The higher the expected 
growths in the TC rates     and   , the higher are the risk adjusted growths rates     and   ,  
and thus the higher are the chances to be in-the-money at expiration. Consequently, the higher the 
chances are to be in-the-money at expiration, the higher is the value of the extension option. 
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We notice that changes in    , and hence    , has a stronger effect than changes in    because 
    appears indirectly in the exponential factor of the BSM formula, thus having a stronger 
impact on the option’s value. The higher    has a positive impact on the underlying asset   of 
the real option. Recall that the underlying asset is the present value of the 5-year TC rate 
observed in today’s market (equation 3.8 at p94). Thus the higher the value of   , the higher 
becomes the option’s value keeping all other parameters unchanged. 
 
Figure 30: Option’s value as function of annual growth in TC-rates 
 
The five year expected growth rate is somewhat easier to predict than the 13 year growth rate.  If 
we have a closer look to the blue curve, it is highly improbable that we may see a growth rate of 
3% or -3% over 13 consecutive years. If that was the case, the LNG shipping business would 
have attracted newcomers (ship owners) increasing the degree in competition. This effect would 
have brought back the growth rate to less extreme levels, as -0.5% to +0.5% for instance. For the 
5-year perspective, the annual growth rate    is more influenced by the short to medium run 
supply and demand forces in the LNG shipping market. It is therefore more probable to observe 
for instance a growth rate of 2% over five consecutive years than over 13 years. 
Further sensitivities could have been carried out by varying key parameters as the volatility σ or 
the correlation coefficient ρ among others, but I will not go into further details in this dissertation. 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The message in this third and last part was to show an example of a specific annual voyage plan 
carried out by a LNG trader. The liquefaction and re-gasification plants across the world are 
many; I have chosen some of them that could fit into the trader’s voyage plan in 2012. The goal 
with this was to study the different exit strategies and analyze in what way the trader can benefit 
from arbitrage opportunities on gas prices across the continents. Indeed, as already mentioned, 
trading LNG between northern Norway and Asia-Pacific all year long, combining the NSR 
during summer and the Suez Canal for the rest of the year cannot be seen as a realistic scenario.  
The trader would have benefited to follow its 2012 voyage plan in the spot charter market and not 
in a 1-year TC. Indeed, the trader would have generated a positive ACF of 0.088 USD/mmBtu in 
spot and a negative ACF of -0.044 USD/mmBtu in a 1-year TC. Some sensitivities by varying 
sailing speed and gas prices were carried out where we saw that the trader’s ACFs can increase. 
Further one, I studied a net present value of a project where the trader maintains and repeats the 
2012 voyage plan over 15 years. Future gas prices where estimated from data by Wood 
Mackenzie. I performed some sensitivities by varying the trader’s required rate of return and the 
ship owner’s capital cost involved in the freight rates. Given a required rate of return of 6% to the 
trader and a freight rate of USD 77,748 per day, the NPV of the trader’s 15-year project would 
have been USD 432 million. The 15-year LNG trading project would have been profitable for 
him. 
Lastly, I decided to analyze the value of an extension option of five years on the 15-year TC 
contract using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula and I came to the conclusion that such an 
option has a substantial value, often ignored by the ship owner and therefore sometimes given 
away. The value found for the 5-year extension option was USD 45 million, a considerable 
amount. Sensitivities were done in order to analyze the behavior of the option’s value. Key 
variables as the expected annual growth rate of the 13-year TC rate have a significant impact on 
the option’s value. Other methods could have been used for valuating this real option. Monte-
Carlo simulations, writing done the Euler schemes by discretisizing the stochastic differential 
equation of the TC rates, could have been also possible. This could have been done by simulating 
random walks factors    assumed normally distributed         
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General Conclusion 
 
The aim of the thesis was to argue for the feasibility and the economic viability of shipping LNG 
via the NSR. Based on History, on the effects of global warming and on the measures taken from 
the Russian authorities to facilitate the NSR transit procedures, there is no doubt that this route to 
Asia-Pacific has a bright future for the Norwegian and Russian LNG shipping industry. The 
location of Melkøya couldn’t be better for commercial LNG shipping to benefit of this new 
gateway to Asia-Pacific during summer. TEPN, in collaboration with TGPL, wishes to take 
advantage of the NSR by sending LNG shipments to Asia from Melkøya during summer in the 
near future. Since Gazprom’s NSR success in 2012 with the Ob River, the Total headquarters in 
Paris claim that they may send their first share of LNG produced in Melkøya via the NSR the 
summer 2013 (Vukmanovic, 2013). TEPN guess that an extra vessel chartered for a spot voyage 
will be envisaged since neither the Arctic Lady nor the Meridian Spirit accomplishes the 
requirements for transiting the NSR. However, TEPN finds hard to see how a transit in 2013 will 
be possible with the repeated problems and shutdowns affecting the LNG plant at Melkøya 
(Endresen, 2013). Despite that, as mentioned in the preliminary conclusion of part I, we should 
expect to see at least one new LNG shipping transit in 2013 according to Tschudi Shipping 
Company AS (Hagen, 2013). 
Samsung Heavy industries in Korea have confirmed an order for two new LNG carriers of 
180,000 m
3
 for charter to Total with planned delivery in January and October 2017. The vessels 
will be placed on a 30-year charter contracts with TGPL in London (Almeida, 2013). The 
contract will be subject to final decision the summer 2013 of whether the Ice Class option will be 
chosen or not. TEPN expect that the option on Ice Class will be chosen. There is no information 
regarding the nature of the engines on these future vessels. According to Laurent (2013), the most 
likely to be installed are TFDE engines. This is not surprising as we have showed and argued 
that, indeed, TFDE LNG carriers are more fuel efficient than Steam Turbine carriers. 
It would be much more profitable for TEPN and TGPL to export LNG to Japan via the NSR 
instead of sailing through the Suez Canal. The subsidiary TGPL has a cost advantage by owning 
a share of gas from Snøhvit. Gas extracted at a low cost and sold to Japan at a high price by 
choosing the NSR is tempting. There are good reasons to believe that other companies think 
NHH, Spring 2013: Haeffelé Nicolas Jan-Paul Page - 103 - 
 
about to do the same. However, it is worth to recall that TGPL has long term contracts and is 
commited to sell its LNG cargos to Europe and to the Gulf of Mexico. Each of the two new 
180,000 m
3
 vessels will be engaged in the transportation of LNG for the Australian Ichthys LNG 
project in which some other Japanese corporations participate and the Sabine Pass Liquefaction 
Project where the American shale-gas will be transformed into LNG for the first time (Almeida, 
2013). Melkøya would be the third plant in which the new vessels would also be engaged in 
(Laurent, 2013). Thus, with three cargo lifting places spread across three continents, TGPL will 
be able to deliver the LNG to a worldwide client base which they have long term contracts with. 
The NSR is not the main explanation or the reason behind the two new orders. The NSR is 
perceived as an important route for Total that can be used when time is optimal. For instance, 
Total’s Ichthys project in Australian will have Korea as the main importer of the LNG. Whenever 
one of the new vessels is scheduled to be at Melkøya in the middle of August for instance, a 
shipment to the clients in Korea via the NSR can be envisaged. 
The NSR will increase in popularity with the years and attract newcomers wishing to send their 
shipment from Europe to Asia-Pacific or the other way round. This recent “A” way should see its 
commercial traffic to increase sharply with the years as long as Russia continues to put enough 
resources to develop the sea route, the region and their ice breaking fleet. Although it will never 
be an alternative highway to the Suez Canal route, at least in the short to the medium term, the 
possibility to choose the NSR with Asia-Pacific as destination seems promising for TEPN. 
Total’s oil & gas activities in Norway and Russia will continue to progress. The Group should 
benefit from the mega project of Yamal in Russia and the Stockman project in the Russian 
Barents Sea in addition to the existing Snøhvit gas field in Norway. The NSR has a big potential. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACF  
 
Annual Cash Flow 
BOG 
 
Boil Off Gas 
BSM 
 
Black-Scholes-Merton  
CAPEX  
 
Capital Expenditure 
CAPM 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CHNL  
 
Center for High North Logistics 
CTA 
 
Conditional Trading Area 
DAP 
 
Delivered At Place 
DCF 
 
Discounted Cash Flow 
DFDE 
 
Dual-Fuel Diesel-Electric 
FOB  
 
Free On Board 
FOE  
 
Fuel Oil Equivalent 
FSRU 
 
Floating Storage Regasification Unit 
GRT 
 
Gross Registered Tonnage 
HFO 
 
Heavy Fuel Oil 
HH 
 
Henry Hub 
IMO  
 
International Maritime Organization 
IRTC 
 
International Recommended Transit Corridor 
JKS 
 
Japan Korea Spot 
LNG  
 
Liquefied Natural Gas 
MHO 
 
Marine Operations Headquarter 
NBDP 
 
Narrow Band Direct Printing 
NBOG 
 
Natural Boil Off Gas 
NBP  
 
National Balancing Point 
NPV 
 
Net Present Value 
NSR 
 
Northern Sea Route 
NSRA 
 
Northern Sea Route Administration 
NYMEX 
 
New York Mercantile Exchange 
OPEX 
 
Operating Expenditure 
PV 
 
Present Value 
PVA 
 
Present Value of an Annuity 
PVGA 
 
Present Value of a Growing Annuity 
ST 
 
Steam Turbine 
TC 
 
Time Charter 
TCP  
 
Time Charter Party 
TC-POP 
 
Time Charter with Purchase Option 
TEPN 
 
Total E&P Norge  
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Appendices 
Appendix A  Source: (Laurent, 2013) 
MERIDIAN SPIRIT DATA ARCTIC LADY 
Meridian Spirit Aps (Teekay) Owner Leif Hoegh 
286 L.O.A (Length overall) in m 288 
43,4 Breadth in m 49 
52 Keel to mast head in m 70,8 
31 680 Light Ship in mt 34 020 
113 608 Summer Displacement in mt 118 898 
12,123 Summer Draft in m 12,329 
Denmark International Flag 
NIS (Norwegian International 
Shipregister) 
Bureau Veritas Class DNV 
North P&I Gard 
Samsung (Korea) Shipyard Mitsubishi (Japan) 
15 January 2010 Delivery date April 2006 
8,6 Propeller Diameter in m 8,8 
5 Propeller Blade number 6 
7,619 Propeller Pitch in m 7,886 
Diesel Electric Wartsila 3x 12V50DF 
+ 1 6L50DF 
Main Engine 
2 Mitsubishi Boilers 60 bars / 
60 mt steam - superheated 
525 Deg C 
ABB Electric Motor Propelling Machinery 
Steam Turbine Kawasaki & 
Reduction gir 
26 200 @ 86 RPM Propulsion in KW 27 600 @ 81 RPM 
Fuel Oil, MGO, BOG (Natural and 
Forced ) 
Propulsion Fuel 
Fuel Oil/MGO, BOG (Natural 
and Forced) 
21,5 Max Speed in knots 20,5 
128,5 mt per day Consumption @ 18,5 knots 165 mt per day 
148,2 mt per day 
  
4 Number of cargo tanks 4 
24 529,300 # 1 36 394,195 
46 269,900 # 2 36 391,263 
46 237,000 # 3 36 398,257 
46 249,200 # 4 36 397,150 
163 285,400 
Total volume @ 98 / 98,5 % in 
m3 
145 580,865 
Membrane Type Mark III System - 
Primary 1,2 millimeter Thickness 
Corrugated Stainless Steel  - 
Secondary 0,6 millimeter Thickness 
Triplex 
Cargo tank Containment System 
39,6 m Diameter Moss Sphere 
Type System 35 millimeter 
Aluminum Thickness 
suspended in the equator by a 
continuous skirt 
Reinforced Polyurethane Foam Cargo Tank insulation Type 
Self Extinguishing extrusion 
expanded 
270 millimeter Cargo Tank Insulation Thickness 225 millimeter 
0,15 BOG Max per day in cargo % 0,15 
98 % Filling Limits 98,5 % 
Filling levels between 2 m and 70% 
of height of the tank are not allowed 
Filling Levels Nil 
Yes Bow thruster Yes 
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Appendix B   Source: (Laurent, 2013) 
 
Port dues Arctic Lady 2013 
Fos Sur 
Mer  
 
France 
Huelva 
 
Spain 
Hammerfest  
Norway 
Suez 
Laden 
Egypt 
Suez 
Ballast 
Egypt 
Futtsu 
Japan 
In-Chon 
South 
Korea 
Bonny  
Nigeria 
Berth hire  7 296 426 816    8 217  
Channel Dues    456 037 387 750    
Immigration Clearance    25 25    
Light dues  1 064  12 126 12 126    
Mooring/ Unmooring 3 220 5 574 25 000 2 353 2 353 5 756 7 500  
Pilotage 8 200 14 576 441 886 398 398 10 951 14 423  
Port clearance fee    50 50    
Port sundries    24 800 24 800    
Towage/ Tugs 29 484 53 847 218 000   33 854 89 957  
Oil Pollution Cess       794  
Harbor Dues 54 355  50 944 3 578 2 578 3 465 15 550  
Tonnage dues      14 969   
Garbage Collection  2 400       
Miscellaneous  120  3 224 3 224    
Watchman 1 000        
Harbor pilotage      6 793   
Escort boat charges   111 000   23 219   
Buoy charges      818   
Fire fighting boat fee      9 005 2 600  
Cargo dues        240 120 
Carrier dues        144 700 
5% VAT on carrier dues        7 235 
Sea Protection Levy        36 479 
Port piers        7 178 
Hire of tugs        68 976 
5% contingency on cargo dues        12 006 
NMA Freight Levy        205 538 
TOTAL 
96 259 84 877 1 273 646 502 591 433 304 108 831 139 042 722 232 
Euros Euros NOK USD USD USD USD USD 
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Appendix C  Source: (Laurent, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Port dues Meridian Spirit  
2013 
Fos Sur 
Mer  
 
France 
Huelva 
 
Spain 
Hammerfest  
Norway 
Suez  
Laden 
Egypt 
Suez 
Ballast 
Egypt 
Futtsu 
Japan 
In-Chon 
South 
Korea 
Bonny  
Nigeria 
Berth hire  6250 380 683    7 060  
Channel Dues    395 076 336 026    
Immigration Clearance    25 25    
Light dues  911  10 292 10 292    
Mooring/ Unmooring 2 700 4 650 25 000 2 353 2 353 5 756 7500  
Pilotage 7 500 12 536 417 486 398 398 10 181 14 423  
Port clearance fee    50 50    
Towage/ Tugs 24 900 46 314 218 000 24 800 24 800 33 854 89 957  
Oil Pollution Cess       681  
Harbor Dues 48 685  43 798 3 028 3 028 2 968 13 322  
Tonnage dues      13 351   
Garbage Collection  2 400       
Miscellaneous  120  3 046 3 046    
Watchman 1 000        
Harbor pilotage      6 226   
Escort boat charges   111 000   23 219   
Buoy charges      818   
Fire fighting boat fee      9 005 2 600  
Cargo dues        273 240 
Carrier dues        123 961 
5% VAT on carrier dues        6 198 
Sea Protection Levy        31 250 
Port piers        8 167 
Hire of tugs        68 976 
5% contingency on cargo 
dues        
13 662 
NMA Freight Levy        233 887 
TOTAL 
84 785 73 182 1 195 967 439 068 380 018 105 378 135 542 759 343 
Euros Euros NOK USD USD USD USD USD 
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Appendix D  Source: (Bakkelund, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-30 
-20 
-10 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
%
 M
o
n
th
ly
 c
h
an
ge
 
Date 
1 year TC S&P500 
